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ABSTRACT
Facing an exceptional challenge of maintaining state roadways with evershrinking financial resources, this research examined multiple facets of the impact of
overweight trucks. The objectives of this research were to investigate the impact of
overweight trucks on pavements and bridges, and develop policy recommendations
based on technical analysis and the modern political and institutional environment in
South Carolina. To achieve the objectives, this research modeled pavement and bridge
deterioration, investigated the adequacy of standard practices in state agencies,
examined how trucking industry perceives those practices, and developed policy
analysis models. Pavement and bridge deterioration analysis revealed that pavement and
bridge damages increase significantly with incremental weights. Combined bridge and
pavement damage costs per mile for different overweight truck types were estimated in
this research.
Permit fees to recover damage costs from overweight trucks are of five basic
structures: flat, distance based, weight based, weight and distance based, and axle based.
To recover additional costs of damage imparted by overweight trucks for load in excess
of the legal weight limits in an axle based fee structure, damage fee will vary between
$24 and $175 per trip for different overweight truck types, while a flat fee structure will
charge all overweight trucks $65 per trip (including $10 adminstrative permit processing
fee). Consideration of axle load, axle configuration and trip length in the fee structure
will reflect damage imparted by each overweight truck more accurately. Under the
current fee structure, overweight trucks in South Carolina pay $30 for a single trip
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permit, and $100 for an annual permit which is equivalent to 3.33 trips. An Ohio DOT
study found that with an annual permit, on average, 24.8 trips were made by an
overweight truck.
This research applied a multiobjective analysis approach to address conflicting
objectives, and to generate detailed tradeoffs between different overweight truck damage
cost recovery fee options. This research presents a case study with two objectives: 1)
minimization of unpaid pavement and bridge damage by overweight freight trucks, and
2) minimization of overweight damage cost recovery fees. The tradeoff analysis reveals
that increasing the flat overweight damage cost recovery fee by $1 from $43 will reduce
unpaid damages by $4.2 million in year 2012 in South Carolina with a high elasticity of
demand. In the axle-based damage cost recovery fee type, increasing the average axlebased overweight damage cost recovery fee by $1 from $43 will reduce unpaid damages
of $3.8 million in year 2012 in South Carolina. These types of tradeoff analyses provide
valuable information to decision makers in selecting an appropriate type and level of fee
for overweight trucks.
Interviews with overweight trucking stakeholders in South Carolina did not reveal
any common consensus on how overweight permit polices should be refined.
Stakeholders expressed their concern that increasing permit fee will surge illegal
overweight trips. It is critical to develop effective enforcement plan to deter illegal
overweight trucks before implementation of new fee policies. As consensus does not
exist among stakeholders, SCDOT must establish a working group with all interested
parties to understand everyone’s concerns before proposing any new policies.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the American highway system has faced an ever growing
funding shortage, and legacy state highways are falling into disrepair. In response,
national forums have engaged in debate over how to generate funds for road maintenance
and upgrade capacity to support the ever increasing traffic demand. Between 1990 and
2003, vehicle-miles travelled (VMT) increased at an average annual rate of 2.32% while
truck ton-miles increased much faster at an average annual rate of 3.06%. Among all
modes of freight transportation, share of highway freight transportation increased from
24% in 1990s to 28% in 2003 (USDOT, 2007). Moreover, trucks and other heavy
vehicles inherently inflict the greatest deterioration due to their large Gross Vehicle
Weight (GVW) and individual axle loads. Additionally, the proportion of trucks
configured with multiple units increased from 24% in 1980 to 28% in 2002 (RITA,
2006). Long-term trends toward larger and heavier trucks have exacerbated the impact of
trucks on the deterioration of roadway infrastructure.
1.1 Problem Statement
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has estimated that from 2008 to
2035 there will be a 72% increase in highway freight demand in the US (FHWA, 2012).
This trend has led to increased demand for the public highway system to support heavier
loads. With decaying infrastructure and shrinking funding allocation to build new
highway systems, transportation agencies must somehow maintain existing highways at
acceptable levels to support this increased demand (ASCE, 2013).
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With a steady increase in highway freight demand, the average size of freight
trucks has also increased. Freight shippers have increased the use of multi-unit trucks to
minimize their transportation costs (FHWA, 2000). Trade negotiations among
neighboring countries and international trade treaties have allowed cross-border operation
of relatively heavy truck traffic. The Texas-Mexico trade corridor experienced a rapid
change in truck traffic and volume after the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) partially opened US highways to Mexican trucks with different axle
configurations in 1993 (Hong et al., 2007). Besides regular freight truck traffic within
federal and state legal weight limits, overweight truck traffic demand (i.e. trucks over
legal limits) were also increasing at a faster pace (FHWA, 2012). As pavement and
bridge damage increases exponentially with load, it is a significant challenge for
transportation agencies to manage overweight truck traffic demand to minimize
infrastructure damage.
Aging transportation infrastructure, a dwindling maintenance budget, and
increasing traffic demand, particularly the increase in the frequency and weight of trucks,
are posing a significant challenge to the US transportation grid in terms of operations and
safety. Truckers have been paying for their additional burden on public infrastructure via
a few revenue mechanisms. Because trucks use large amounts of fuel, they are subject to
proportionately higher gas taxes, higher registration fee, and tire taxes. Toll roads have
typically had variable rates according to the number of axles on vehicles (i.e. the more
axles the greater the cost).
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Public agencies have monitored truck weights to ensure they stay within
acceptable limits. For the largest of loads, all states charge fees for oversized and/or
overweight vehicles. The effectiveness of these fees structures in collecting enough
revenue for mitigating the costs inflicted is unknown, however. The legacy fee structure’s
insufficiency has not been examined in context of changing freight demand, rising cost of
maintenance, and changing heavy-vehicle policies across the nation. Due to this
confluence of conditions, multiple factors must be addressed at once in order to update
the fee policies for heavy vehicles.
1.2 Research Objectives and Tasks
This research addresses the effectiveness of overweight freight truck fee
structures in collecting enough revenue for mitigating the costs inflicted by specific
overweight loads. The research objectives entail (1) characterizing the extent to which
state departments of transportation (DOTs) have recovered maintenance costs incurred
from allowing passage of overweight loads and current practices among all U.S. states,
(2) identifying scientific reasons of pavement and bridge deterioration due to trucks
above legal weight limits, (3) identifying current and promising practices to overcome
these adverse effects in order to ensure healthy transportation infrastructure, and (4) using
a multi-objective analysis to evaluate conflicting freight mobility policies. Finally, this
research will create policy recommendations related to overweight truck mobility. To
accomplish the research objectives, following six tasks were conducted:
Task 1: Literature Review (Chapter 2)
Task 2: Research Method (Chapter 3)
3

Task 3: Pavement and Bridge Damage Estimation (Chapter 4)
Task 4: Evaluation of Fee Structures (Chapter 5)
Task 5: Policy Trade-off and Implementation Challenges (Chapter 6)
Task 6: Conclusions and Recommendations (Chapter 7)
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1 describes an
overview of the research problem and objectives of this research. Chapter 2 includes a
comprehensive literature review on pavement and bridge damage estimation, current
overweight freight policies among states in the US and application of policy analysis
techniques. The method adopted in this research is summarized in Chapter 3. Chapter 4
presents pavement and bridge damage estimation and quantification details for
overweight trucks in South Carolina. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss fee structure comparison
and policy analysis, respectively. Conclusions and recommendation were developed
based on the findings of this research, and is presented in Chapter 7. Appendices included
data and background related to key analyses conducted in this research.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, previous research on pavement and bridge deterioration due to
freight traffic, especially overweight trucks, were summarized with a discussion on
freight traffic demand trends and current overweight permit practices among states in the
US.
2.1 Trends in Freight Traffic Demand
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has predicted an overall 73percent increase in shipment volume from 2008 to 2035 with a concurrent increase in
truck freight of 72 percent (Table 1). With decaying infrastructure and lack of resources
to build new highway systems, transportation agencies are challenged to maintain
existing highways at acceptable levels while truck freight is increasing significantly
(ASCE, 2013).
Table 1 Projected Weight of Shipments by Transportation Mode: 2008 and 2035
(millions of tons)
Shipment Type
Truck
Rail
Water
Air, air & truck
Intermodal
Pipeline & unknown
Total

2008
13,243
2,007
632
13
1,661
3,940
21,496

2035
22,813
3,525
1,041
61
2,598
7,172
37,211

Change
72.3%
75.6%
64.8%
355.2%
56.4%
82.0%
73.1%

Annual Change
2.7%
2.8%
2.4%
13.2%
2.1%
3.0%
2.7%

Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2010
While the number of trucking loads has increased, the size of individual loads has
also increased. Freight shippers have turned to multi-unit trucks (Figure 1) to minimize
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their transportation costs (RITA, 2006). The United States Department of Transportation
(USDOT) identified a trend of heavy vehicles increasing their vehicle miles between
1987 and 2002 (Table 2 and Figure 2), which increased axle loadings on pavements and
gross vehicle weights on bridges.

Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2000
Figure 1 Truck configurations have grown versatile to accommodate increased
freight (Longer combination vehicles are not legal in South Carolina)
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Table 2 Truck Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) by Average Weight: 1987-2002
Average Weight
(pounds)
Total

1987 VMT
(millions)
89,972

2002 VMT
(millions)
145,624

Percentage
Change
62%

Annual
Change
4.1%

10,768

26,256

144%

9.6%

10,001 to 14,000

5,440

15,186

179%

11.9%

14,001 to 16,000

2,738

5,908

116%

7.7%

16,001 to 19,500

2,590

5,161

99%

6.6%

Medium-heavy

7,581

11,766

55%

3.7%

19,501 to 26,000

7,581

11,766

55%

3.7%

71,623

107,602

50%

3.3%

26,001 to 33,000

5,411

5,845

8%

0.5%

33,001 to 40,000

4,113

3,770

-8%

-0.5%

40,001 to 50,000

7,625

6,698

-12%

-0.8%

50,001 to 60,000

7,157

8,950

25%

1.7%

60,001 to 80,000

45,439

77,489

71%

4.7%

80,001 to 100,000

1,254

2,950

135%

9.0%

100,001 to 130,000

440

1,571

257%

17.1%

130,001 or more

185

329

78%

5.2%

Light-heavy

Heavy-heavy

Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2010
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Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2010
Figure 2 Highway Vehicle Miles Traveled: 1980-2007
International trade treaties have increased this heavy-vehicle traffic by allowing
cross border operation of trucks from other countries. The Texas-Mexico trade corridor
showed a rapid change in truck traffic and volume after 1993 when the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened US highways partially to Mexican trucks with
different axle configurations (Hong et al., 2007). A Texas study estimated a $7.7 billion
investment was needed to increase the load-carrying capacity of Texas highway bridges
alone, while a significant cost would be simultaneously incurred in rerouting existing
traffic during construction (Luskin and Walton, 2001).
2.2 How Trucks Deteriorate Transportation Infrastructure
According to the 2013 ASCE Infrastructure Report Card, 30% of bridges are
older than design life, and to replace deficient bridges by 2028, an annual investment of
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$20.5 billion is needed; however, the current annual investment is only $ 12.8 billion
(ASCE, 2013). The increasing demand and decreasing support for maintenance has only
exacerbated this difficulty; highways continue to degrade in service capacity. An Arizona
study found that overweight trucks alone caused approximately $12 million to $53
million in annual uncompensated pavement and bridge damage in the state (Straus et al.,
2006).
Experimental analysis has shown that the greatest damage to pavement is
associated with axle weight, axle spacing, and thickness of pavement layers; in contrast,
bridge damage has been attributed mostly to heavy GVW (Luskin and Walton, 2001).
Unless engineers across the nation anticipate about 72 percent increase in truck loads by
2035 as indicated in Table 1 and act accordingly, growing volumes of heavy loads will
accelerate transportation infrastructure deterioration. The following subsections depict
how trucks impact pavement and bridge deterioration.
2.2.1 Pavement Deterioration
Roadways have a range of standards from high-standard interstates to lowstandard local streets. A truck that will cause little or insignificant damage to interstates
might cause significant damage to local streets. An Ontario study examined the relative
impact of regular trucks on different types of roadways and concluded that pavement
damage costs for a typical truck over 1 km (0.62mi) of roadway might vary from $0.004
for a high-standard freeway to $0.46 for a local street (Hajek et al., 1998).
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Although light passenger vehicles are the dominant users of highways, they are
not considered in pavement design due to the relatively low amount of damage imparted
by these vehicles compared to trucks. Therefore, freight traffic is the primary traffic input
considered in pavement design. The heavier truck loads develop excessive stress and
strain on different pavement structural layers, and results in different form of distress and
ultimate pavement fatigue failure. Pavement damage increases exponentially with
increase of vehicle axle load magnitude (Luskin and Walton, 2001; WSDOT, 2001).
Pavement damage due to one heavy freight truck could be equivalent to that of thousands
of light weight passenger vehicles. Due to limited axle numbers in buses, loaded
articulated bus could cause much more damage compared to heavy trucks (Pavement
Interactive, 2013).
Though only a small percentage of trucks operate beyond legal weight limits, they
account for significant amount of total pavement damage (Luskin and Walton, 2001; Liu,
2007). To manage permitted and illegal overweight trucks, an Arizona study estimated a
savings of $4.50 in pavement damage for every $1 invested in mobile enforcement
(Luskin and Walton, 2001). A study in Egypt estimated that increasing axle weight limits
from 10 tons to 13 tons will reduce pavement service life by half, and overweight loads
beyond maximum pavement load bearing capacity should not be allowed in any
circumstance due to sudden structural failure (Salem et al., 2008).
The emergence of modern truck configurations, as indicated in Figure 1, has
necessitated evolution in pavement design to handle the effect of load and configuration
(FHWA, 2010). A Michigan study found that single and tandem axles of trucks had a
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more significant impact on cracking than trucks with multiple axles (tridem and higher).
Conversely, the trucks with multiple axles elicited more detrimental effect on pavement
rutting than single and tandem-axle trucks. No correlations appeared between axle
configurations and pavement roughness (Salama et al., 2006). Another study found that
larger axle combinations reduced pavement fatigue damage while increasing rutting
(Chatti et al., 2004; FHWA, 2000). A study of overloaded tridem and trunnion axles
reported differing impacts depending on the flexible or rigid pavement. While tridem
axles cause the most damage to flexible pavements, trunnion axles cause more damage to
rigid pavements with identical axle loads (Hajek et al., 1998).
While transportation professionals have mostly focused on truck loadings, other
factors have also contributed to pavement deterioration (e.g., vehicle design). Research
has found that a passive-axle suspension system and optimized suspension stiffness and
damping resulted in a 5.8% reduction in pavement damage by minimizing the dynamic
impact of axle loads (Cole et al., 1996). Dynamic forces from axle loading cause most
pavement fatigue failures. When heavy loads exceed typical vehicle speeds, damage may
accelerate by a power of four and service life can decrease by 40% or more (Luskin and
Walton, 2001).
Advances in pavement design are accommodating modern refinements in
awareness of the impact of weight, as well as other factors. New pavement modeling
techniques have the potential to use diverse geographic and traffic-demand scenarios
(Hajek et al., 1998; Sadeghi et al., 2007; Salem, 2008). It is quite evident from the
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literature that trucks cause disproportionately higher damage to pavement than passenger
cars because of their higher weights and axle configurations.
2.2.2 Bridge Deterioration
Though bridges comprise a small percentage of total highway mileage, their costs,
construction time, and traffic disruption upon failure or temporary closing significantly
impact highway system performance. Moreover, the catastrophic nature of bridge failures
in terms of user fatality, property loss, and traffic disruption necessitates maintaining the
structural integrity and serviceability of bridges and merits substantial consideration.
In 2009, 12 percent and 13 percent of U.S. highway bridges were classified
structurally deficient and functionally obsolete respectively (Office of Bridge
Technology, 2010). The American Association of State Highway and Transportation
Officials (AASHTO) estimated $140 billion of repairs needed to raise existing bridges to
acceptable standards in 2008. Merely maintaining current bridge conditions would
require an investment of $13 billion per year while total investment was $10.5 billion in
2004 (ASCE, 2009).
Though many factors affect bridge structures, overweight truck loading is a
fundamental cause of such deterioration. Although load factors are specified in the design
codes and utilized in the design of bridges for increased safety and reliability (AASHTO,
2007), overweight trucks can compromise bridge safety and accelerate deterioration.
Overloading old bridges can cause substantial problems in that modern overweight trucks
are much heavier than the initial bridge design load and older bridges might have been
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compromised by deicing agents corroding reinforcement (Jaffer et al., 2009). Existing
bridges might also exhibit other deteriorations (e.g. thermal or fatigue cracking). The
compounding effect of corrosion, fatigue cracking, and overloading can significantly
exacerbate the deterioration.
Overweight trucks also reduce the service lives of bridges or cause fatigue failures
(Chotickai et al., 2006a, Chotickai et al., 2006b). Repetitive low-level stress reversal
causes structure fatigue failure. A typical fatigue failure curve represents stress versus the
number of loading cycles (Figure 3). Under overweight loading, stress increases from σ2
(point B) to σ1 (point A) and the corresponding number of loading cycles to fatigue
failure reduces from n2 to n1.

Graph adapted from Chotickai et al., 2006
Figure 3 Fatigue failure curves indicate the relationship between cycles and stress
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In addition to fatigue cracking, cracks initiated by other factors might have
existed prior to overloading fatigue cracks. Cracks are expected to occur in reinforced
concrete structures must be considered in their design. In contrast, prestressed concrete
bridges must maintain service-level compressive stress throughout the lifetime of the
bridges. An inappropriate construction sequence (e.g. wrong stressing sequences) can
cause cracks in prestressed bridges (Moon et al., 2005), the initiation of which plus
overloading from heavy trucks will accelerate deterioration of prestressed bridges. In
addition, cracking can render rebar vulnerable to water erosion, which will result in
corrosion, and possibly accelerate bridge deterioration. Corrosion will reduce the
effective cross-section area of the reinforcing bars and bond between the rebar and
concrete, strength (Stewart and Rosowsky, 1998). This combination of corrosion and
cracking with overloading from heavy trucks can significantly reduce the service life of
bridges under such stressors.
A Minnesota study of steel bridges built before 1980 found 33 percent and 73
percent more repairs were necessary if GVW increased by 10 percent and 20 percent
respectively. Newly built steel-girder bridges, however, may not exhibit any significant
damage due to increased GVW of up to 20 percent because of upgraded design standards.
For concrete bridges, shear failure is more dominant than fatigue failure and existing old
concrete girder bridges may lack any shear failure risk for a GVW increase up to 20
percent (Altay et al., 2003).
Creating standards for bridges has been particularly difficult. State and local
agencies use the Federal Bridges Formula (FBF) or modified FBF to determine the
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maximum allowable load on bridges. This FBF formula gives advantages to multi-axle
trucks by allowing them to carry more weight and restricts small trucks (FHWA, 1990).
While many bridge studies and models exist, researchers cannot generalize many findings
because the specific bridge conditions, traffic patterns, truck fleets, and environmental
conditions were not replicated elsewhere. However, all bridges studies revealed that
heavy weight trucks reduce bridge service life significantly due to excessive stress, and
require more frequency maintenance.
2.3 Federal and State Weight Limits
States began establishing regulations to preserve transportation infrastructure as
early as 1913 (FHWA, 2000) and the federal government established the first national
standards with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. The Federal-Aid Highway Act
Amendments of 1974 refined the national weight standards based on research from the
American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials (AASHTO), and only
minor modifications have appeared since (FHWA, 2000). Table 3

presents current

federal weight limits for interstates.
Table 3 Federal Weight Standards for Interstate Highways
Weight

Axles

20,000 pounds per axle

Single axles

34,000 pounds per axle pair

Tandem axles

80,000 pounds or Federal Bridge Formula
(FBF)

Gross vehicle
weight

Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2000
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While these federal regulations appear standard, several anomalies are still
inherent in standard practice. Three states gross vehicle weight limits on interstates are
higher than federal 80,000-pound limit (Table 4). On non-interstate highways, thirteen
states have allowed gross vehicle weights higher than 80,000 pounds. A combination of
seventeen states has exceeded federal single-axle weight limits on interstate and noninterstate highways. Twelve states have allowed interstate loads to surpass federal
tandem-axle limits, and twenty states have allowed excessive weights on non-interstate
highways.
Table 4 Interstate Gross Vehicle Weight Standards Exceeding Federal Limits
State

Standard

Oregon

105,500 pounds

Washington

105,500 pounds

Wyoming

117,000 pounds

2.4 Exceptions to Weight Limits
For situations where shippers cannot fit their loads to federal and state
regulations, states have created permitting structures for oversized and/or overweight
loads through a combination of parameters. These overweight loads could be classified in
two different types: divisible and non-divisible. Non-divisible means loads that cannot be
broken down into smaller pieces and weigh more than the legal weight limit, whereas
divisible loads mean general overweight trucks that can be reduced in weight to maintain
the legal weight limit. Most of the states do not issue overweight permits for divisible
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loads. Focusing on weight issues rather than size because weight deteriorates
infrastructure, this section identifies common parameters used.
2.4.1 Distribution of Permits
States have established permitted exceptions for either single use or blanket
coverage (multiple uses, monthly use, seasonal use, or annual use). In most states,
truckers using single-use permits must perform the trip within a specified period of time,
usually 3 to 5 days.

Data collected from the web sites of state departments of

transportation in 2011, and the Truck Sizes and Weights Manual (J.J. Killer &
Associates, 2011) revealed 21 states had single-trip permits with fees ranging from $5 to
$135 irrespective of either weight or total distance traveled. States issue annual permits in
a goal to reduce related administrative permit processing costs as well as to ease permit
applications for overweight trucking companies. Overall there is a growing trend of more
annual permits of non-divisible overweight loads (a 28% increase between 2005 and
2009) than single permit increase of 21% (Table 5). A similar case is true for divisible
overweight permits. Annual permits with a flat fee can benefit trucking companies by
reducing time spent applying for permits for every trip and by reducing the overall fee
paid. Flat annual permits allow unlimited trips during the year.
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Table 5 Distribution of Permit Types
Permit Type

Year 2005

Year 2009

2,712

3,286

Non-divisible annual permits (thousands)

233

299

Divisible single trip permits (thousands)

288

370

Divisible annual permits (thousands)

393

574

3,626

4,529

Non-divisible single trip permits (thousands)

Total Permits (thousands)

Source: Federal Highway Administration, 2010

To account for infrastructure deterioration with an annual permit, states must
estimate how many trips per year a permit will generate, the average distance each trip
will cover, and the amount of excess weight the truck will carry. Although some states
consider distance and amount of overweight in setting fees for annual permits, most states
charge fixed rates for annual permits irrespective of distance and excess weight. A 1995
study indicated annual permitting generated less revenue than single-use permitting
(Moffett and Whitford, 1995) as an annual permit is not associated with the total number
of trips.
2.4.2 Allowable Gross Vehicle Weight
Gross vehicle weight directly relates to the impact of truckloads on bridge
deterioration. Whereas the federal government has limited GVW up to 80,000 pounds,
states have been willing to allow much heavier loads with permits, as Figure 4 indicates.
The most commonly permitted weights in the US for five-axle semi-trailer range from
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100,001 pounds to 110,000 pounds, with a mean of 105,800 pounds and the maximum

Number of States

reach 132,000 pounds. Five states have not specified a maximum GVW.

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Mean 105,800 lbs
Median 105,000 lbs
Mode 100,000 lbs

≤ 80000

80,001 90,000

90,001- 100,001- 110,001- 120,001- > 130,000
100,000 110,000 120,000 130,000
Gross Vehicle Weight (pounds)

Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011 and state departments of transportation

Figure 4 Routinely Permitted Allowable Limits for 5-Axle Semi-Trailers
2.4.3 Allowable Axle Weights
In addition to maximum allowable GVW, any load can be classified as
overweight if any axle load exceeds the axle weight limit. In certain states, the number of
axles (or implicitly, the weight per axle) is considered in maximum loading thresholds.
The maximum permitted load allowed for a single axle ranges from 20,000 pounds to
45,000 pounds (Figure 5). Nine states have not specified a maximum single-axle limit.
Figure 6 shows that limits on tandem axles range from 34,000 pounds to 65,000 pounds
with 7 states setting the most common limit at 40,000 pounds. Twelve states have no
specified maximum for tandem axles.
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Number of States
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Mean 26,000 lbs
Median 25,000 lbs
Mode 24,000 lbs

16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
No Routine Permit

20,001-25,000

25,001-30,000

>30,000

Single Axle Limit (pounds)
Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011 and state departments of transportation

Figure 5 Routine Permit Allowable Limit (Single Axle)
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Mean 46,900 lbs
Median 46,000 lbs
Mode 40,000 lbs

Number of States
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12
10
8
6
4
2
0
≤ 40,000

40,00145,000

45,00150,000

50,00155,000

55,00160,000

> 60,000

Tandem Axle Limit (pounds)
Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011, and state departments of transportation

Figure 6 Routinely Permitted Tandem Axle Weights
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2.4.4 Superload Classification
For loads in excess of the upper thresholds of regular overweight permits known
as “super-loads,” states have often required a route study to avoid excessive infrastructure
damage or failure and to verify infrastructure capacity and safe operation. Permit
structures have included super-loads only in terms of gross vehicle weight (no explicit
consideration of axles) especially to protect the load carrying capacity of bridges along
the specific super-load route. While some states have implicitly or explicitly prohibited
highway operations for trucks that exceeded the maximum overweight limit allowed with
typical overweight permits, others have simply allowed super-load provided a permit has
been issued. For example, New Mexico has allowed loads as high as 200,000 pounds or
more, but has imposed additional fees for such weight and relied on engineering studies
to verify the load carrying capacity of the route where the truck with super-load will
travel. Figure 7 indicates the distribution of super-loads states have permitted. Three
states have not specified the load beyond which a special permit is required, and they deal
with super-loads on a case by case basis.
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12
Mean 158,400 lbs
Median 150,000 lbs
Mode 150,000 lbs

Number of States

10
8
6

4
2
0

Gross Vehicle Weight (pounds)
Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011, and state departments of transportation

Figure 7 Routinely Permitted Weights for Super-Loads among States
2.5 User Fees for Overweight Trucks
All of the parameters identified in section 2.4 allow state DOTs to track the extent
of overweight shipping on roadways to greater or lesser degrees of refinement. This
tracking is useful for estimating acceleration of deterioration, which facilitates
maintenance scheduling and inventory tracking. At a minimum, fees for overweight
permits cover the cost of this administrative tracking that follows from shippers placing
excessive loads on public infrastructure.
In addition to the administrative costs of the permitting process, some state DOTs
would like permit fees to contribute to funding maintenance and rehabilitation of
infrastructure proportionate to the damage an overweight load inflicts. Efficient and
equitable user fees can lead to highway system provisions meeting a more demanding
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standard that reduces overall lifecycle costs (Small et al., 1989). The following
subsections explore the theory and application of such user fees.
2.5.1 User-Fee Concepts
User fees have appeared since early civilizations for basic municipal services like
water and sewage removal. Political, philosophical, and economic rationales have been
used to justify user fees for public services (Bowlby et al., 2001).
Political rationales for user fees are characterized by user acceptance of the fees
and the accountability of collected revenue. Conflicting objectives influence any financial
decision made by elected bodies; they maintain special considerations to assure user fees
represent actual use and ensure accountability by attributing the fee to a proposed use.
Political action on transportation user fees has shifted in the United States, devolving
from federal and state initiatives to local initiatives such as local taxes to build and
maintain transportation infrastructure (Wachs, 2003).
Philosophical rationales of user fees justify that only people who benefit from a
service should pay for that service; non-users should not have to subsidize what they do
not use. In the context of transportation funding, localities increasing general sales taxes
(e.g. a one-cent sales tax dedicated to funding public transit) do not qualify as user fees
because non-transportation goods are also taxed. The general sales tax does not charge
transportation users directly for benefitting from the system; hence the sales tax is less
equitable and efficient than the fuel tax (Crabbe et al., 2005). Overweight permit fees do
qualify as user fees because only users of the permits pay the tax; however, shippers
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might share the benefit indirectly. If that user fee improves infrastructure and passenger
cars use the infrastructure in the future, those drivers should philosophically pay a fee.
Economic rationales seek economic efficiency. When truckers are willing to pay
the same amount of money that the transportation department needs to receive to cover
costs, the market achieves economic efficiency by reaching the equilibrium state.
Economic evidence says the United States has not reached economic equilibrium in the
market for freight infrastructure. The Engineering News-Record’s cost index identified
an 817-percent increase in major construction materials between 1957 and 2002
(McGraw Hill Construction, 2003) while the 50-state average fuel tax in inflation
adjusted dollars was 11 cents per gallon less in 2003 than in 1957 (Wachs, 2003). This
acute revenue shortage has contributed to the current crisis of infrastructure deterioration
while demand for new capacity is increasing at a rapid pace.
2.5.2 Setting User Fees
Evidence has shown the axle-based fee structures common to toll roads and
overweight permitting fails to collect money proportionate to damage inflicted by loads
on roads. A 2008 study of fee collection among different truck classes used weigh-inmotion (WIM) data from two stations along Texas highway SH 130. Single-unit trucks
caused more damage compared to semitrailers, but paid less in fees (Conway et al.,
2008).
Assigning the correct cost to a truckload’s trip requires modeling different traffic
loads over infrastructure in the condition of a specific state. A Louisiana study
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investigated the extent of bridge damage along non-interstate corridors for four different
combinations of gross vehicle weight and axle weight. With models of all 87 bridges on
the corridors, the study concluded that trucks with GVW of 120,000 pounds caused
$11.75 fatigue cost per trip per bridge where gross weights of 100,000 pounds caused
only $0.90 fatigue cost per trip per bridge (Wang et al., 2005). Notably, this study
provided cost estimations per trip per bridge. A single origin-destination trip in the state
might involve a large number of bridges, incurring many times the cost per bridge.
How should fees increase as weight increases? A pavement deterioration model
for a flexible pavement section in Iran considered pavement material properties,
including asphalt layer thickness, pavement temperature, subgrade condition, and traffic
speed. Upon determining relative damage due to several truck weights, the pavement
damage increased exponentially, with significant amounts of damage experienced when
weights exceeded the allowable weight limit (Sadeghi et al., 2007).
2.5.3 User Fees in Practice
Overweight single-trip truck fees in fifty states have fallen into five categories, as
indicated in Table 6. While single trip permit can be categorized into five different types,
annual/blanket permits are mostly flat with limited consideration of distance or excess
weight. Two states have not engaged in issuing single trip permits.
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Table 6 Prevalence of Single-Trip Fee Categories
Type of Fee

States Administering in 2011

Flat
Axle based
Weight based
Distance based
Weight and distance based

21
5
10
2
11

2.5.3.1 Flat Fees
The flat user fee is simplest to administer for both state permit offices and
trucking companies. In 2011, 21 states issued flat-fee single-use permits with charges
ranging from $5 to $135 with a median of $25 per single trip (Figure 8). Flat fees
commonly have addressed the administrative costs of issuing permits with contribution to
highway maintenance. To date, South Carolina has issued flat-fee permits for overweight
trips.
8
Mean $36
Median $25

Number of States

7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
< $11

$11-20

$21-30

$31-40
User Fee

$41-50

$51-60

> $60

Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011, and state departments of transportation

Figure 8 States Issuing Single Trip Permits with a Flat User Fee
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2.5.3.2 Weight Based Fees
Weight based fees charge for tons of load exceeding the legal limit, as indicated
in Figure 9. States with low weight based fees inherently encourage heavy-weight
industries while higher fees discourage them. States administering single-trip weightbased permits in 2011 charged from $0.1 to $20 for per ton of excess load.

Number of States

4
3
2
1
0
$ 0.1-2.0

$2.1-4.0
$4.1-6.0
Fee per Ton

>$6.0

Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011 and state departments of transportation

Figure 9 States Issuing Single Trip Permits with a Weight Based User Fee
2.5.3.3 Weight and Distance Based Fees
Comprehensive fee structures used at the state level at the time of this research
considered both the excess weight imposed on infrastructure and the length of
infrastructure exposed to that weight. In 2011, 11 states offered single-use overweight
permits based on weight and distance. Figure 10 shows their fee structures ranging from
2 cents to 14 cents per ton-mile.
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Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011, and state departments of transportation

Figure 10 Single Permit Fees per Ton-Mile
2.5.3.4 Distance Based Fees
While weight permits account for the stress placed on a piece of infrastructure,
they do not account for the extent of exposure. Two trucks might have equal weight and
pay equal amounts for permits while one traverses a local trip and the other crosses the
entire state. Charging for distance offers consideration of how much length of roadway an
overweight vehicle impacts. Two states issue distance-based single-use permits without
considering the amount of excess weight shipped. Virginia set its distance rate at 10¢ per
mile while Indiana set rate at 34¢ per mile up to 120,000 lbs. Just as many states have
done with weight-based permitting, Virginia has not attempted to create a distance-based
annual permit.
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2.5.3.4 Axle Based Fees
Axle-based fees have commonly emerged for individual facilities, such as
turnpikes and toll bridges. Evidence has shown the axle-based fee structures common to
toll roads and overweight permitting fails to collect money proportionate to damage
inflicted by loads on roads. A 2008 study among different truck classes used weigh-inmotion (WIM) data from two stations along Texas highway SH 130. Single-unit trucks
caused more damage compared to semitrailers while paying less in fees (Conway et al.,
2008). A truck with many axles can spread its weight across them, thus impacting
pavement with less weight per axle, yet a higher number of axles is penalized in
traditional axle-based fees.
Consideration of axles appears to be gaining favor. Five states have been setting
overweight fees with number of axles and vehicle configurations in fee calculation for
single trips. South Carolina’s stakeholders supported consideration of vehicle
configuration in principle with recognition of demand for increasing weight per axle.
For a system based on axles and vehicle configuration, South Carolina
stakeholders voiced regional consistency as their biggest concern. Some shipping
companies have voiced resistance to reconfiguring their fleets to accommodate one state.
One stakeholder suggested private companies will be more willing to invest in new
equipment if South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia all recognize the same
standards.
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2.5.3.5 Annual Fees
Regardless of the type of single-use permit employed, most states have offered
permits for unlimited overweight trips in a year. Most annual permits are in the form of
flat-fee permit with limited consideration for weight and distance. Flat-fee annual permit
rates of states varied from $10 to $2,500 with median at $250 (Figure 11). The logic of
annual fees is unclear. Presumably, states would offer a rational relationship between
single-use and annual permits; however, the data have failed to reveal a strong
connection. In 2011, one state charged $5 for a single use and $10 for an annual permit
even though truckers with annual permits likely took more than two trips per year. An
Ohio DOT study found that with annual permits 24.8 trips were made on average
(ODOT, 2009). A survey among trucking companies or a log book survey of overweight
trucks with annual permits could reveal this imbalance between annual and single-trip
permit rates.
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Figure 11 Flat User Fee- Annual Permit
2.6 Multiobjective Analysis in Transportation Infrastructure Policy Making
Multiobjective analysis has been applied in transportation decision making
endeavors such as resource allocation, asset management, investment decision making,
and network optimization to address the conflicting multiobjective nature of each
decision problem (Atkinson and Shultz, 2009; Chowdhury et al., 2002; Chowdhury et al.,
2000; Fwa et al., 2000; Bai et al., 2012). Fwa et al. demonstrated the superiority of
multiobjective optimization over traditional single objective optimization in pavement
maintenance programming (Fwa et al., 2000), the efficiency of which has been achieved
by simultaneously considering minimization of cost, maximization of network condition
and maximization of maintenance work. Similarly, Bai et al. applied multiobjective
optimization in highway asset management, in which they conducted a tradeoff analysis
to optimize multiple network level performance measures (Bai et al., 2012). To overcome
the difficulty of including a number of criteria that cannot be translated into monetary
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unit in traffic safety improvement projects, multiobjective optimization was applied to
select a level of investment in several conflicting highway safety improvement projects to
maximize overall safety benefits as well as to minimize the total investment level
(Chowdhury et al., 2002). In another study by Chowdhury and Tan, a multiobjective
optimization technique was applied to a transportation investment policy tradeoff
analysis. The selection of the best alternative from multiple options was guided by a
multiple conflicting measure of effectiveness (MOEs) (Chowdhury and Tan; 2005).
Additionally, multiobjective analysis has been utilized in tradeoff analysis in many
transportation studies (Fwa et al., 2000; Bai et al., 2012; Chowdhury et al., 2002;
Chowdhury et al., 2000).
In the context of freight transportation, most of the research entailing multiple
objectives has been conducted in freight transportation supply chain management to
develop optimal solutions to minimize freight truck fleet size, environmental impact, and
inventory and transportation costs (Hwang, 2009; Sabria and Beamon, 2000). No effort
has been made to investigate the impact of overweight truck policies that considers both
the damage to aging transportation infrastructure service life while considering freight
operators’ objectives or interests in the context of multiple conflicting objectives. This
research utilized a multiobjective analysis to develop tradeoffs associated to different
overweight truck damage cost recovery fee types.
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHOD
As outlined in section 1.2, this research was divided in six distinct tasks to
accomplish the research objectives. In the following sections, the research method
adopted for each task is elaborated.
3.1 Literature Review
A comprehensive review was conducted to compile previous researches on
pavement and bridge deterioration estimation due to heavy trucks, and current overweight
freight truck fee structures and management policies among US states and presented in
Chapter 2.
3.2 Pavement and Bridge Damage Estimation
Quantification of pavement and bridge damage due to different vehicle type is a
critical issue for any highway transportation cost allocation studies. In the following
subsections the details of damage quantification approach adopted for this research are
discussed.
3.2.1 Pavement Damage Estimation Method
An analysis procedure based on a study by the Ohio DOT was adopted to estimate
overweight truck pavement damage parameters (ODOT, 2009). As flexible pavements
are the major paving material used in South Carolina, this research assumed the asphalt
concrete built state highway system. The analysis was based on the different highway
functional classes considered in the damage estimations to represent a variation in traffic
demand by functional class. All pavements were assumed to possess the identical Hot
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Mix Asphalt (HMA) Surface Course (1.9 inch), HMA Intermediate Course (2.0 inch),
and Graded Aggregate Base Course thicknesses (6.0 inch) (Figure 12). The thickness of
the HMA Base Course varied depending upon traffic demand in that this layer is the most
likely to be altered to adjust the varying traffic demand (the average annual daily truck
traffic).
The primary concern with any pavement design is the amount of truck traffic that
the pavement must endure throughout its life. It was estimated that 8.3% of the trucks in
each truck category were loaded to the respective maximum weight limit based on WIM
data collected at the St. George WIM station (Chowdhury et al., 2013). The average
annual daily traffic (AADTT) for each functional class included in this research was
estimated based upon the South Carolina statewide freight model. AADTT estimates
compiled for each functional classes and 85-percentile of all AADTT estimates in each
functional class was used in pavement design and damage calculations.
The pavement design utilized the procedures set forth by the SCDOT Pavement
Design Guidelines (2008), which uses an equivalent single axle load (ESAL) approach to
determine the required structural number to accommodate a given number of design
ESALs (AASHTO, 1993). As the ESAL factor does not change significantly between SN
5 and 7, a standard highway flexible pavement section with structural number (SN) 5 and
terminal serviceability index (Pt) 2.5 were assumed to estimate the corresponding damage
of each weight category of each truck type, which was used to estimate the pavement
damage ESALs.
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Figure 12 Schematic of Flexible Pavement Design Dimensions
To quantify the pavement damage costs due to overweight trucks, three design
scenarios were considered. In design scenario 1, pavements were designed for minimum
design standards when there was 0% truck in the traffic stream. These costs were
distributed to all vehicles (e.g. passenger cars and trucks) irrespective of damage
contribution of vehicle types. In design scenario 2, pavements were designed for truck
traffic demand (AADTT) with no overweight trucks. The additional costs above
minimum design scenario were distributed to all trucks as additional costs were
accounted for pavement design improvement to support demand truck traffic. In design
scenario 3, 8.3% trucks were considered overweight and the design cost excess of
scenario 2 was distributed to overweight trucks only.
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3.2.2 Bridge Damage Estimation Model
Figure 13 shows steps followed to estimate bridge damage by overweight trucks.
Representative trucks models from SC Permit Database and Violation Database were
developed to conduct bridge fatigue damage analysis. As it is not feasible to model all
bridges, four archetypes bridges were selected based on statistical analysis of South
Carolina bridge characteristics. National Bridge Inventory database was utilized to
extract bridge characteristics information, such as total bridge length, traffic volume, and
material type (NBI, 2012). Finite element (FE) models for archetype bridges were
developed in LS-DYNA to perform fatigue analysis and analyzed at Argonne National
Laboratory supercomputing facility.

Truck Models

Archetype Bridge Finite Elememt (FE) Models

FE Stress Analysis

Bridge Fatigue Life

Annual Bridge Fatigue Damage
Figure 13 Bridge Damage Modeling Methodology
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Next step was to determine monetary value of bridge damage due to overweight
trucks. Bridge replacement cost models were first developed utilizing HAZUS-MH
program database (HAZUS-MH, 2003). To estimate bridge damage cost due to
overweight trucks, bridge fatigue damage models and bridge replacement cost models
were combined and used as inputs for the bridge cost estimation methodology outlined in
Figure 14.

Bridge Fatigue Damage and Bridge Replacement Cost

Annualized Bridge Fatigue Damage Cost and
Maintenance Cost

Annual Bridge Damage Cost

Overweight Trucks Bridge Damage Cost

Figure 14 Bridge Cost Estimation Methodology
Finally, annual bridge fatigue damage cost and annual bridge maintenance cost
were combined to estimate total annual bridge damage cost due to overweight trucks
(Chen, 2013). Results of pavement and bridge damage estimation following the research
method discussed in this section are presented in Chapter 4.
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3.3 Evaluation of Fee Structures
Before implementation of new fee structure supported by pavement and bridge
damage estimation, it is critical to investigate relative performance of different fee
structures and select the best option which will maximize revenue without any negative
or minimum impact on overweight business and economy. Based on the survey of
existing fee structure implemented by DOTs, an analysis was conducted to examine the
relative efficiency of different fee structures, which is presented in Chapter 5.
3.4 Policy Tradeoff and Implementation Challenges
Preserving and extending the longevity of the US public transportation
infrastructure is one of the primary goals of state DOTs for supporting the increased
volume of passengers and freight traffic in terms of volume and average payload. In this
section, tradeoff analyses were performed to provide valuable information to decision
makers (DMs) to select an appropriate type and level of fee structure for overweight
trucks (section 3.4.1). Besides, an online survey with state DOTs in US and Canada, and
an interview with trucking stakeholders in South Carolina were conducted to understand
and investigate concern of public agencies involved in transportation decision making
and trucking associations (section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Policy Tradeoff Analysis
The primary goal of the overweight permit program maintained by DOTs is to
record the extent of all overweight trips in the states. Overweight truck operators are
required to secure a permit by paying a fee to DOTs stating the amount of excess weight
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above legal weight limits. This permit fee covers the administrative costs of the dedicated
DOT permit program, and a damage fee to recover additional damage to pavements and
bridges for weights above legal weight limits. There are several overweight permit fee
types implemented by DOTs nationwide. Different fee types place a different cost burden
on different truck types, favoring some types over others. Such as flat permit fee would
favor heavy overweight trucks as they pay less for much higher damage than light
overweight trucks.
The most challenging aspect of any optimization model is the development of
functional relationships among constraints and multiple objectives. An overweight freight
operation scenario with two objectives (bi-objective) is formulated and solved to examine
the applicability of a multiobjective optimization approach in overweight permit fee and
policy analysis. Details of the multiobjective optimization method are explained in
Appendix A. Two objective functions are considered: (1) minimization of unpaid damage
due to overweight freight trucks, and (2) minimization of overweight truck damage cost
recovery fee to reduce the transportation cost in the context of overweight trucking
operations on the South Carolina state highway system. Currently, South Carolina DOT
issues permits to overweight trucks and charges a flat $30 for single trips. The damage
quantification shows that the damage imparted by overweight trucks is much higher than
the current fee (Chowdhury et al., 2013). A review of overweight permit fee types among
the 50 states reveals four most frequently used fee types (Chowdhury et al., 2013). In the
second objective of the bi-objective problem (minimization of overweight truck damage
fee), the following four fee types were considered:
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1) Flat damage cost recovery fee, where all overweight trucks pay the identical
permit fee without any consideration to the amount of overweight load and the
distance traveled in each trip,
2) Axle based damage cost recovery fee, where the overweight amount, the truck
configuration, the axle loads and the trip distance are considered in determining
the damage cost recovery fee,
3) Weight based damage cost recovery fee, where overweight trucks pay for the
amount of excess weight above the legal weight limits, and
4) Weight and distance based damage cost recovery fee, where the amount of the
overweight load as well as the trip distance are considered in the damage cost
recovery fee calculation.
Generally, an increase of transportation cost (i.e., permit fee), tends to decrease
the demand for overweight freight shipped. It is known that freight demand is
comparatively less sensitive to increases in transportation cost (i.e., inelastic), and in the
existing literature, though limited, there are wide variations in the elasticity estimates of
freight demand, primarily due to differences in the estimation models (Graham and
Glaister, 2004). It has been observed in various supply and demand studies on freight that
the elasticity of the freight demand varies between -0.5 and -1.5 depending upon the type
of freight goods (Graham and Glaister, 2004). In this research, it was assumed elasticity
values of high (-1.5), medium (-1.0), and low (-0.5) to present the sensitivity of the
overweight freight demand to transportation cost (i.e., permit fee). In response to demand
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sensitivity, the number of overweight permits demand decreases with an increase in
permit fees.
In this research, the multiobjective model led to a bi-objective optimization
problem (BOP) for four different damage cost recovery fee types to generate tradeoffs
between different fee levels (Table 7 and Table 8). Table 7 explains the model parameters
and decision variable, and Table 8 summarized the mathematical representation of two
objective functions and constraints.
Table 7 Bi-objective model parameters and decision variable
Parameters

Explanation
(

)

(
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)

Table 7 Bi-objective model parameters and decision variable (continued)

Per trip damage cost recovery fee for
due to additional imparted damages by a truck loaded
above the legal weight limit up to maximum weight limit with a typical
overweight permit
dc

Flat per trip damage cost recovery fee for all overweight trucks
Per ton per trip damage cost recovery fee for
due to additional imparted damages by a truck loaded above the
legal weight limit up to maximum weight limit with a typical overweight
permit
Per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee for
due to additional imparted damages by a truck loaded above the
legal weight limit up to maximum weight limit with a typical overweight
permit

Decision
Variable

Explanation
( )
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Table 8 Objectives and Constraints
Conflicting Objectives
Primary objective (Minimize unpaid damage)

∑ ∑(

Second objective (Minimize damage cost recovery fee)

∑∑

Constraints (to be satisfied by
Pareto optimal solutions)

)

Explanation

1)
2)

(

)

3) Per trip damage cost recovery fee at 100% damage cost recovery scenario
In axle based fee type
In flat damage fee type
In weight based fee type
In weight distance based fee type
4) Per trip damage cost recovery fee at x% damage cost recovery scenario
In axle based fee type
In flat damage fee type
In weight based fee type
In weight distance based fee type
5) Unit damage fee at x% damage cost recovery scenario
(

)

(
(
(

)
)

In axle based fee type
In flat damage fee type
In weight based fee type

)

In weight distance based fee type

6)
7)
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3.4.2 Implementation Challenges
To explore the state-of-the-art practices across the nation and perspectives of all
stakeholders related to overweight businesses in South Carolina two distinct tasks were
conducted: 1) comparison of standard practices among states in US and Canadian
provinces, and 2) interview with the freight stakeholders within South Carolina.
3.4.2.1 Review of Current Practices
This research captured the current state of the practice by bringing together public
records and a survey of state and provincial departments of transportation in the United
States and Canada. Public records provided general truck weight limits and information
on overweight permit programs from the 50 states. Web data gathered in October and
November 2011 validated and supplemented data and information on overweight truck
management practices from the Vehicle Sizes and Weights Manual (J.J Keller &
Associates Inc., 2011).
For the online invited survey, DOTs in the United States and Canada received
invitations to participate to provide their perspectives about current overweight permit
practices in the fall of 2011. The questioners and response summary tables can be found
in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively. Total 16 responses were received,
amounting to 27 percent of the total population of 60. Attempts were made to raise the
response rate by sending email reminders twice and extending the time allowed for
responses. Still facing low response and a small sample size, this research only presents
data from questions where respondent answers generally matched.
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3.4.2.2 Stakeholders’ Interview
The main objective of stakeholders’ interview was to present findings of this
research to stakeholders involved with overweight trucking, and to explore how permit
policies should be formulated and revised to tackle infrastructure deterioration issues.
The objectives of these interviews were to:


Establish the discussion framework where all

public and private sector

stakeholders learn about the issues related to overweight truck operations and
transportation infrastructure maintenance needs in South Carolina,


provide opportunities to each stakeholder to explain individual’s issues and
needs,



get familiar with diverse overweight business practices in South Carolina,
and



explore the acceptability of potential new policies to all stakeholders to
improve current overweight permit policies in South Carolina.

Interview methodology followed in this research was built upon a similar study
conducted by Virginia Transportation Research Center (VTRC, 2008). Interview
questions were sent about one month before scheduled interview date with findings from
this research, which allowed respondents to prepare their agency perspectives by
discussing the questions and responses with agency members. Supporting information
was provided to give an overview of current South Carolina overweight permit practices
and funding needs to maintain status quo of SCDOT maintained highways.
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3.4.2.2.1 Participating Organizations
A set of interview participants was selected considering organizations and
agencies expected to have a stake in trucking and the transportation infrastructure in
South Carolina. The list focused on state organizations, but some national organizations
were contacted because they might have perspective of national viewpoints and stances.
Following organizations were participated in the interview:


Greenville Chamber of Commerce Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee representing business and shippers



South Carolina Trucking Association representing shipping companies



South Carolina State Transport Police representing law enforcement



South Carolina Department of Transportation representing

interests of

infrastructure maintenance


South Carolina Farm Bureau representing the agricultural industry



Carolinas Ready-Mixed Concrete Association representing heavy construction
materials

Several other organizations were contacted to participate in this interview. The
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) South Carolina office referred to
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) as research objective mostly aligns with
FHWA mission. However, FHWA did not participate, because FHWA was also a
sponsor of this research. The American Trucking Association recommended contacting
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South Carolina Trucking Association which has local experience with South Carolina
overweight permit issues. The South Carolina Department of Commerce declined to
participate. The office of South Carolina State Senate Transportation Committee
Chairman Larry Grooms indicated willingness to participate but was unavailable to set an
interview date within the research timeline.
3.4.2.2.2 Interview Process
All participating organizations were contacted first in mid-February 2013
describing primary objectives of the interview and this research. Then an email with
details supporting document was sent. Supporting document explained the interview
objectives, preliminary findings from this research including permit practices across the
nation, interview questions and list of all participating organizations. Each participant
discussed the questions with colleagues to summarize their agency perspectives about
interview questions before the final phone interview. Phone interviews were conducted in
early April 2013. As the primary objective of this interview was to compile stakeholders’
perspective accurately, it was assured that no one will be cited explicitly without prior
confirmation.
3.4.2.2.3 Interview Content
The interviews covered the following nine questions.
1) Regarding the information provided, what comments or questions do you
have?
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2) What are the primary issues to consider when balancing the needs of freight
movement and infrastructure maintenance?
3) Equity can be viewed in many ways. What are the primary considerations for
ensuring fairness in setting permitting policies and fees?
4) How should overweight permitting fees be set relative to the calculated
amount of damage overweight vehicles inflict? If you recommend a difference from the
exact amount of damage, how do you justify it? How should that difference be
calculated?
5) What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of
implementing the following potential fee structures in South Carolina?


Flat fees



Weight-based fees



Fees based on weight and distance



Fees considering axle configurations

6) Annual permitting practices in the United States have ranged from charging
less than the cost of 2 single permits to the equivalent cost of 52 single permits. South
Carolina currently sets an annual permit fee equivalent to 3 ⅓ single trips. Should South
Carolina offer flat fees for annual permits, and if so, what frequency of usage should be
assumed in setting the value for the permit? Why that frequency?
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7) Setting permitting structures must consider permit value. If South Carolina
increases fees for overweight vehicles, what transportation-system improvements should
emerge to serve operators of heavy and overweight vehicles and related stakeholders?
8) Beyond the numbers, what considerations need to be evaluated for weight and
infrastructure policies? Examples might include but not be limited to administrative
processes, logistics, legal frameworks, state or global competitiveness, and so forth.
9) What other issues would you like to raise? what remaining comments do you
have?
Interview did not include any questions on research results rather focused on
stakeholders’ perspectives, and issues that are critical and need to be addressed in future
public discussion for new fee policies. Findings of stakeholders’ interviews were
summarized in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.
3.5 Development of Conclusions and Recommendations
Based on the findings of this research, research findings were summarized in
Conclusions (Section 7.1) and recommendations were proposed to improve South
Carolina’s current overweight permit practices (Section 7.2) and presented in Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER IV: PAVEMENT AND BRIDGE DAMAGE
ESTIMATION
In this chapter, pavement and bridge damage estimation results were presented
and damage cost was quantified to facilitate damage fee calculation.
4.1 Estimation of Pavement Deterioration
To estimate pavement and bridge damage, representative truck models were
developed utilizing SCDOT overweight permit database for year 2011 and South
Carolina legal weight limits (SC Code of Laws, 2012; SCDOT, 2012a, b). The truck
configurations included in Figure 15 were used in this research; however, the analysis
was based on a distribution of trucks and not just a single truck. This change was made
for this analysis to more accurately represent the damage (or design changes) that would
result from having only a portion of the truck traffic be considered overweight, which
was a more realistic scenario. In this study, it was assumed that 8.3% of the trucks in
each truck category were loaded to the respective maximum limit. This assumption is
based on WIM data collected at the St. George WIM station in South Carolina on I-95.
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Figure 15 Truck Categories and Load Distribution for Each Load Scenario
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4.1.1 Freight Demand on Different Functional Highway Classes
To estimate pavement and bridge damage caused by different truck types, the
AADTT on different functional classes of SCDOT maintained highways were compiled
using the TRANSEARCH database and a statistical analysis was performed to determine
85th -percentile AADTTs for 2011 as summarized in Table 9. This 85th -percentile
AADTTs for year 2011 were utilized to design typical pavement sections (see Appendix
D for summary statistics). The distribution of truck types was included in Table 10 and
was based on the WIM data collected from St George station on Interstate 85.
Table 9 AADTT Estimate on Different Functional Classes in South Carolina
Functional Class

AADTT (2-way) 85th Percentile

Rural Interstate

13,150

Rural Arterial

1,210

Rural Collector

570

Rural Local

640

Urban Interstate

14,080

Urban Freeway/Expressways

10,870

Urban Arterial

1,700

Urban Collector

1,940

Urban Local

730

4.1.2 Truck Traffic Composition
Truck classification data was collected from the St. George weigh-in-motion
(WIM) station on I-95 from November 2010 to May 2011 (SCDPS, 2012). Table 10
presents the summarized truck type distribution at the St. George WIM station. The data
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shown on Table 10 includes the only tuck type distributions available; thus they were
applied to all truck routes considered in this research.
Table 10 Truck Type Distribution at the St. George WIM Station
FHWA
Vehicle Class

FHWA Vehicle Class

Axle
Grouping

Percentage

5

Single unit 2-axle truck

2-Axle

8.84%

6

Single unit 3-axle truck

3-Axle

1.15%

7

Single unit 4 or more-axle truck

4-Axle

0.05%

8

Single trailer 3 or 4-axle truck

9

Single trailer 5-axle truck

10

Single trailer 6 or more- axle truck

11

Multi trailer 5 or less-axle truck

5-Axle

2.52%

12

Multi trailer 6-axle truck

6-Axle

0.02%

13

Multi trailer 7 or more-axle truck

7-Axle
8-Axle

0.06%

3-Axle
4-Axle
5-Axle
6-Axle
7-Axle

9.10%
75.97%
2.30%

4.1.3 Estimated Vehicle Miles Traveled
Vehicle miles traveled (VMT) is the most commonly used performance measure
in transportation system performance analysis. The total damage imparted to pavements
and bridges by any truck depends on the total vehicle miles traveled. To estimate unit
damage cost due to different truck types, the VMT in 2011 on SCDOT maintained
highways were estimated. Primarily 2011 VMT was collected from the 2011 Highway
Statistics for South Carolina (FHWA, 2012). VMT on SCDOT maintained highways
were then adjusted using the statewide total lane miles and SCDOT maintained lane
miles. Total lane miles on all South Carolina highways and SCDOT maintained highways
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are presented in Table 11 (CDM Smith, 2013). Utilizing the FHWA passenger vehicle
and heavy vehicle VMT estimate, the average truck percentage on different functional
classes were estimated (Table 12) (FHWA, 2012). Truck VMT on SCDOT maintained
highways were estimated using truck percentages from Table 12 and are presented in
Table 13. To estimate the percentage of trucks above legal axle or gross vehicle weight
limits, WIM observations were utilized. An analysis of WIM data from the St. George
weigh station on I-95 revealed that, on average, 8.3% of total truck observations were
overweight, either by axle or gross vehicle weight. This estimate was used to compute
statewide overweight truck VMT.
Table 11 Statewide and SCDOT Maintained Highway Lane Miles (Year- 2011)
Total SC Lane
Miles
2,376

SCDOT Maintained
Lane Miles
2,376

Rural principal Arterial

3,860

3,860

Rural Minor Arterial

7,266

7,247

Rural Major Collector

21,057

20,734

Rural Minor Collector

4,307

3,952

63,669

25,661

1,424

1,424

322

322

Urban Principal Arterial

3,955

3,952

Urban Minor Arterial

4,076

3,968

Urban Major Collector

5,180

4,646

21,988

12,205

139,480

90,347

Functional Class
Rural Interstate

Rural Local
Urban Interstate
Urban Freeway/Expressways

Urban Local
Total
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Table 12 Percentages of Trucks on Different Functional Classes (Year- 2011)
Functional Class

Truck Percentage

Interstate Rural

23.45%

Other Arterial Rural

12.40%

Other Rural

9.18%

All Rural

13.98%

Interstate Urban

10.06%

Other Urban

5.56%

All Urban

6.64%

Total Rural and Urban

9.07%

Table 13 SCDOT Maintained Highways VMT (Year- 2011)

Functional Class

SCDOT Maintained
Highway, Daily VMT
2011

Rural Interstate

SCDOT Maintained
Highway, Daily
Truck VMT 2011

20,442,020

4,792,818

9,446,629

1,171,446

Rural Minor Arterial

13,518,756

1,676,418

Rural Major Collector

13,188,164

1,211,170

Rural Minor Collector

699,462

64,237

2,625,464

241,116

16,725,902

1,682,109

2,226,133

223,880

Urban Principal Arterial

19,843,849

1,102,329

Urban Minor Arterial

14,845,836

824,688

Urban Major Collector

8,491,119

471,683

Urban Local

3,255,881

180,865

125,309,215

13,642,759

Rural Principal Arterial

Rural Local
Urban Interstate
Urban Freeway/Expressways

Total
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To determine the operational effects of truck traffic, a micro simulation model of
106 miles of Interstate 85 in South Carolina was developed using the VISSIM microsimulator. Several scenarios with varied levels of truck distributions within the traffic
stream were modeled for year 2011. Truck percentages among other traffic on the I-85
corridor were increased by 5% and 10 % from the existing average percentage of trucks
in the corridor in each simulation experiment. No significant change in travel time along
the corridor was observed due to increases in truck traffic.
4.1.4 Overweight Truck Trip Length
Pavement and bridge damage cost due to overweight trucks depends on each
overweight trip length. Currently SCDOT overweight truck permit applications require
that truckers provide information on both the origin and destination of trips. As trip
lengths were not reported explicitly in current permit applications, a typical trip length by
different truck types was estimated using the 2002 South Carolina Economic Census data
(Table 17) (US Census, 2004). It has been assumed that trucks operate a regular five day
work week, with an average of one trip per day. The total number of trips for a year
(2012) was estimated using the estimated trip length and the annual VMT for each truck
class.
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Table 14 Estimated Overweight Truck Trip Length and Number of Trips
Truck Type

Trip Length
(miles) (tij)*

Number of
Trips (Nij)*

Distribution of
Trips(rij)*

2 axle

75

496,667

17.12%

3 axle, single unit

100

48,448

1.67%

3 axle, combination

125

153,473

5.29%

4 axle, single unit

270

735

0.03%

4 axle, combination

270

71,052

2.45%

5 axle semi-trailer

160

2,067,989

71.29%

6 axle semi-trailer

160

30,723

1.06%

7 axle semi-trailer

160

30,927

1.07%

8-axle semi-trailer

160

681

0.02%

*tij, Nij and rij are mutiobjective tradeoff analysis model parameters

4.1.5 Pavement Damage Estimation
The pavement design utilized the procedures set forth by the SCDOT Pavement
Design Guidelines (2008), which uses an ESAL approach to determine the required
structural number to accommodate a given number of design ESALs (AASHTO, 1993).
The number of design ESALs for each functional class was calculated using ESAL
factors presented in Table 15. The ESAL Factor was based on the truck configuration
(Figure 15) and the respective ESAL factor for each individual truck type (Table 15).
Based on the required number of ESALs, the required structural number for each
pavement design was determined.
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Table 15 ESAL Factors for Pavement Design Scenarios
Truck
Category
A21

Distribution of Truck
Type in Traffic Stream
8.84%

ESAL Factor for ESAL Factor for
80% Legal Limit Max Limit
0.720
3.020

A31/32

5.70%

0.488

1.74

A41/44/45

4.55%

1.075

3.835

A42/43

0.05%

0.755

2.035

A51/52

78.49%

1.024

3.760

A61/62

1.17%

0.501

4.469

A71

0.60%

0.299

5.380

A72

0.60%

0.292

5.108

Combined ESAL Factor with No
Overweight Trucks

0.954

Combined ESAL Factor with 8.3% Overweight Trucks

1.174

The required HMA Base Course thickness was then calculated based on the
required structural number for each functional class. All of the pavement design inputs
are summarized in Table 16. Total traffic ESALs demand for each functional for a design
life of 20 years were calculated.
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Table 16 Input Parameters Used For The Pavement Designs
Variable
Structural Layer Coefficients (a)

Value

HMA Surface Course (a1)

0.44

HMA Intermediate Course (a2)

0.44

HMA Based Course (a3)

0.34

Graded Aggregate Base Course (a4)

0.18

Soil Support Value (SSV)

1.5

Regional Factor (R)

1.0

Present Serviceability Index
Initial serviceability (po)
Initial serviceability (pt)

4.2
2.5

……………………………..(1)
where,
AADTT

= Average annual daily truck traffic

fd

= Directional distribution factor (0.5)

fl

= Lane distribution factor (0.95)

ESAL factor

= From Table 15

G

= Growth factor =

r

= Growth rate (2%)

n

= Design life (20 years)
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The total number of 18-kip ESALs for each pavement design was calculated using
Equation (1) from the SCDOT Pavement Design Guidelines (2008). The total number of
design ESALs for each pavement design is presented in Table 17. Table 17 summarizes
the number of ESALs for each design scenario along with the structural number (SN) and
HMA Base Thickness (H3) required to support the number of ESALs using Equation (2).
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Table 17 Functional-Class Pavement Design Specifics Used in Damage Estimation
Functional Class

No Overweight Trucks

8.3% Overweight Trucks

ESALs

SN

H3 (in)

ESALs

SN

H3 (in)

Rural Interstate

52,840,256

8.07

15.50

65,043,806

8.28

16.12

Rural Principal
Arterial

4,862,107

5.98

9.35

5,985,019

6.15

9.85

Rural Minor Arterial

2,290,414

5.40

7.65

2,819,389

5.55

8.09

Rural Major Collector

2,571,693

5.48

7.88

3,165,630

5.64

8.35

Rural Local

56,577,248

8.14

15.71

69,643,862

8.35

16.33

Urban Interstate

43,678,600

7.89

14.97

53,766,249

8.09

15.1

Urban Freeway

6,831,060

6.24

10.12

8,408,705

6.41

10.62

Urban Principal
Arterial

7,795,445

6.35

10.44

9,595,816

6.52

10.94

Urban Minor Arterial

2,933,337

5.58

8.18

3,610,797

5.74

8.65
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To determine the cost of the damage attributed to overweight trucks, it was first
necessary to determine the replacement cost for each pavement design included in the
analysis. The replacement cost of construction was based on typical unit prices for the
materials used to construct each pavement layer. Table 18 provides unit construction cost
data for the different pavement layers. These unit costs included installation and were
based on actual cost data provided by SCDOT for 2011.
Table 18 Unit Construction Cost Data for Flexible Pavement Layers (2011 $)
Pavement Layer

Cost

HMA Surface Course (Type A)

$4.62 per inch/yd2

HMA Surface Course (Type B)

$4.22 per inch/yd2

HMA Intermediate Course (Type B)

$4.14 per inch/yd2

HMA Base Course (Type A)

$3.76 per inch/yd2
$5.62 per 6-inches thickness

Graded Aggregate Base

Based on the pavement design for each traffic scenario for different highway
functional classes (Table 17) and the unit costs provided in Table 18, construction cost
per lane-mile was estimated for each design scenario as summarized in Table 19. The
total SCDOT highway network pavement replacement costs were calculated using per
lane-mile costs and the total lane-miles for each functional class in the SCDOT network
as summarized in Table 20. Based on this analysis, having8.3% of overweight trucks to
the normal truck traffic will result in an estimated increase in pavement replacement costs
by more than $1.1 billion.
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Table 19 Pavement Cost Estimates (2011 US $) Related to Overweight Trucks
Functional Class

Estimated Cost per Lane-Mile
No Overweight Trucks

8.3% Overweight Trucks

Rural Interstate

569,944

586,356

Rural Arterial

401,801

415,036

Rural Collector

356,801

368,448

Rural Local

362,889

375,331

Urban Interstate

575,503

591,915

Urban Freeway/Expressways

555,915

559,356

Urban Arterial

422,183

435,418

Urban Collector

430,654

443,889

Urban Local

370,831

383,272

The absolute minimum pavement design at an estimated cost of $96,012 per lanemile.

Table 20 SCDOT-Maintained Pavement Replacement Costs (2011 $)
Functional Class

Total LaneMiles

Estimated Total Cost
No Overweight
Trucks

8.3% Overweight
Trucks

Rural Interstate

2,376

1,354,142,109

1,393,134,871

Rural Arterial

11,107

4,462,827,371

4,609,831,531

Rural Collector

24,687

8,808,210,479

9,095,734,717

Rural Local

25,661

9,311,997,874

9,631,244,901

Urban Interstate

1,424

819,291,974

842,655,760

322

179,182,525

180,291,677

Urban Arterial

7,920

3,343,648,472

3,448,469,933

Urban Collector

4,646

2,000,989,333

2,062,485,366

Urban Local

12,205

4,525,913,209

4,677,754,200

Total

90, 347

34,806,203,346

35,941,602,957

Urban
Freeway/Expressways
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The pavement replacement cost was divided into three categories to distribute
among all vehicle types depending on their damage contribution. These costs were
distributed by considering two damage factors: i) miles of travel (VMT), and ii) relative
damage to pavement (in terms of ESALs). In Table 21, three cost items were separated
where; a) additional pavement cost represents costs required to increase pavement
thickness to accommodate overweight trucks which was distributed to overweight trucks
only by ESAL factor, b) minimum pavement cost that was shared by all vehicles
irrespective of relative damage, and distributed to all vehicle types including overweight
trucks by miles of travel (VMT), c) remaining cost to accommodate the no overweight
truck scenario (when there was no overweight truck traffic on the system, and required
pavement thickness dictated by AADTT demand are within legal limit) was distributed to
all trucks based on relative damage factor ESAL. A minimum design scenario of a
pavement section with a 1.9 inch HMA surface course and 6 inch graded aggregate base
course was assumed when there was no truck traffic on highways.
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Table 21 Total Pavement Replacement Cost (2011 US $)

Functional Class

Additional
Pavement Cost
(For Overweight
Trucks)

Minimum
Pavement
Cost (No
Truck
Traffic)

Pavement Cost
For All Trucks

38,992,763

228,116,831

1,126,025,278

Rural Arterial

147,004,161

1,066,411,045

3,396,416,326

Rural Collector

287,524,238

2,370,209,839

6,438,000,640

Rural Local

319,247,027

2,463,735,128

6,848,262,746

23,363,786

136,683,643

682,608,331

1,109,152

30,946,588

148,235,938

Urban Arterial

104,821,460

760,405,439

2,583,243,033

Urban Collector

61,496,033

446,110,157

1,554,879,176

151,840,991

1,171,807,258

3,354,105,952

1,135,399,611

8,674,425,928

26,131,777,419

Rural Interstate

Urban Interstate
Urban
Freeway/Expressways

Urban Local
Total

To distribute the pavement cost to respective vehicle types, design VMT and
ESAL-miles were estimated for a pavement design life of 20 years with a traffic growth
factor of 2% based data from 2011 (Table 22). Then unit damage costs were estimated
and shown in Table 23.
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Table 22 Design VMT and ESAL-Miles for 20 Years of Pavement Design Life
Estimate

Daily 2011

20 Years Total

All VMT

125,309,215

1,111,430,084,065

Light Vehicles VMT

111,666,456

990,425,631,610

13,642,759

121,004,452,455

1,132,349

10,043,369,554

12,510,410

110,961,082,901

4,085,515

36,236,477,350

11,934,931

105,856,873,088

All truck VMT
Overweight truck VMT
Regular weight truck VMT
Overweight truck ESAL-mile
Regular weight truck ESAL-mile

Table 23 Unit Pavement Damage Cost Estimate
Estimate

Design Life Total

All VMT
Overweight truck ESALmile
All Truck ESAL-mile

Unit Cost

1,111,430,084,065 $0.0078 Per Mile
36,236,477,350 $0.0313 Per ESAL-Mile
142,093,350,438 $0.1839 per ESAL-mile

Finally, to estimate the damage cost for each truck type loaded at the maximum
limit, per mile damage costs were estimated for respective overweight truck ESAL
magnitude and summarized in Table 24.
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Table 24 Unit Pavement Damage Cost by Truck Type and GVW (2012 US $)
ESAL

Per mile Damage Cost*

2-axle, 35-40 kips

3.02

$0.41

3-axle, single unit, 46-50 kips

1.74

$0.24

3-axle, combination, 50-55 kips

3.32

$0.46

4-axle, single unit, 63.5-65 kips

2.035

$0.29

4-axle, combination, 65-70 kips

3.835

$0.53

5-axle, 80-90 kips

3.76

$0.52

6-axle, 80-90 kips

1.848

$0.26

6-axle, 90-100 kips

2.966

$0.41

6-axle, 100-110 kips

4.469

$0.62

7-axle, 80-90 kips

0.998

$0.15

7-axle, 90-100 kips

1.61

$0.23

7-axle, 100-110 kips

2.48

$0.35

7-axle, 110-120 kips

3.66

$0.51

7-axle, 120-130 kips

5.24

$0.74

8-axle, 80-90 kips

0.808

$0.12

8-axle, 90-100 kips

1.268

$0.18

8-axle, 100-110 kips

1.976

$0.28

8-axle, 110-120 kips

2.775

$0.39

8-axle, 120-130 kips

3.885

$0.56

Truck Type

4.2 Bridge Damage Estimation
Bridges represent a relatively small percentage of total lane miles compared to
pavement. However, bridge construction and maintenance costs as well as the disruption
to traffic associated with replacement or failure are significantly high in comparison. In

*

The damage cost values from base year 2011 to year 2012 with CPI of 1.17%.
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the following subsections, the quantification of bridge damage due to overweight trucks
was presented.
4.2.1 Bridge Deterioration Model
First step in bridge damage estimation was to develop archetype bridges to
represent groups of bridges that share common features and structural characteristics.
Four types of archetype bridges were modeled to quantify bridge damage due to trucks
for this study. The details of the archetype bridge selection can be found in (Chowdhury
et al., 2013).
Finite element (FE) models for each archetype bridge was developed using the
LS-DYNA finite element program. In this step, the FE models were developed and
analyzed with combinations of archetype bridges and truck models. Bridge fatigue life
for each archetype bridge using the stress ranges were calculated form the FE analysis
performed at Aragon National Laboratory supercomputing facility. More details on the
fatigue life analysis can be found in (Chen, 2013).
4.2.2 Bridge Damage Cost Estimation
To estimate bridge damage costs due to overweight trucks, bridge fatigue damage
models and bridge replacement cost models were combined and used as inputs for the
bridge cost estimation. The bridge replacement costs were estimated using HAZUS-MH
program database (HAZUS-MH, 2003) which contains replacement costs of half of all
South Carolina bridges. More details on the development of the bridge cost models can
be found in (Chen, 2013).
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4.3 Combined Axle-Based Pavement and Bridge Damage Cost
Total damage cost due to overweight trucks can be broken down into two parts
(Figure 16). Part 1 is the total damage imparted by a truck loaded at legal weight limits,
and Part 2 represents additional damage cost due to additional weight allowed with
typical overweight permits beyond the legal weight limit. In this study, damage costs
were estimated for trucks loaded at legal weight limits and at corresponding maximum
weight limits with typical overweight permits. Pavement and bridge unit damage costs
were combined to estimate per-mile and per-trip damage costs for different overweight
truck configurations.
Maximum Weight Limit with a Typical SC
Overweight Permit

Unit Damage
Cost

Legal Weight Limit

Overweight


=+



Gross Vehicle Weight
Note:
Unit damage cost for a truck loaded at the legal weight limit
Additional unit damage cost due to additional weights above the legal weight limit
to the maximum weight limit with typical SC overweight permits
Unit damage cost for a truck loaded at the maximum weight limit with typical SC
overweight permits
Figure 16 Damage Contribution of Trucks at Different Gross Vehicle Weights
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In Table 25, combined pavement and bridge damage cost per mile and per trip are
presented considering estimated trip length for different truck types (Table 14 provides
trip length by different truck types). As truck axle load and configurations were
considered in the cost calculation, this cost can be interpreted as axle based damage cost.
Additional damage cost due to additional weight of overweight trucks is shown in Table
25 (Column 6). As shown in Table 25, pavement and bridge damage increase
substantially above legal weight limits. As an example, a 2-axle truck is loaded at the
legal weight limit of 35,000 pounds incurs a damage cost of $26.42 per trip. Permitting
5,000 pounds above the legal weight limit increases the damage by $24.19 to a total of
$50.61 of damage imparted for the trip, which indicates that overweight trucks cause
accelerated damage to pavements and bridges above the legal weight limit.
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Table 25 Combined Pavement and Bridge Damage Cost for Different Truck Types (2012 $)
Per Mile
Damage for a
Truck
Loaded at the
Legal Weight
Limit

Per Mile Damage
for an Overweight
Truck Loaded up
to the Maximum
Overweight Limit

Per Trip
Damage for
a Truck
Loaded at
the Legal
Weight
Limit

Per Trip Damage
for an Overweight
Truck Loaded up
to the Maximum
Overweight Limit

Additional per Trip
Damage above the
Legal Limit for an
Overweight Truck
Loaded up to the
Maximum Overweight
Limit

2-axle, 35-40 kips

$0.3523

$0.6748

$26.42

$50.61

24.19

3-axle, single unit, 46-50 kips

$0.2474

$0.3933

$24.74

$39.33

14.58

3-axle, combination, 50-55 kips

$0.4442

$0.7444

$55.53

$93.05

37.53

4-axle, single unit, 63.5-65 kips

$0.3585

$0.4600

$96.78

$124.21

27.42

4-axle, combination, 65-70 kips

$0.4884

$0.8247

$131.87

$222.68

90.80

5-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.4583

$0.8420

$73.33

$134.73

61.40

6-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.2585

$0.4407

$41.36

$70.52

29.16

6-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.2585

$0.6834

$41.36

$109.35

67.99

6-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.2585

$1.0123

$41.36

$161.97

120.61

7-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.1428

$0.2556

$22.84

$40.89

18.05

7-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.1428

$0.3956

$22.84

$63.29

40.45

7-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.1428

$0.5880

$22.84

$94.08

71.23

7-axle, 110-120 kips

$0.1428

$0.8440

$22.84

$135.04

112.20

7-axle, 120-130 kips

$0.1428

$1.1730

$22.84

$187.67

164.83

8-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.1140

$0.2005

$18.23

$32.08

13.84

8-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.1140

$0.3059

$18.23

$48.94

30.70

8-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.1140

$0.4668

$18.23

$74.69

56.46

8-axle, 110-120 kips

$0.1140

$0.6497

$18.23

$103.96

85.72

8-axle, 120-130 kips

$0.1140

$0.9030

$18.23

$144.47

126.24

Truck Type ( See Figure 15 for
details)
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CHAPTER V: EVALUATION OF FEE STRUCTURES
Analyses comparing the performance of the most widely used overweight damage
cost recovery fee types are presented in this chapter. All fee types developed in this
research do not include a permit administration fee. Only damage costs due to additional
weight above legal weight limit to be recovered through different damage cost recovery
fee types were estimated. The analyses presented in this section compare damage costs
for a single trip. State DOTs issue annual/blanket permits without limitation on number
of trips. Due to lack of average number of trips with annual permit statistics, no attempt
was made to compare annual permit fee types for overweight trucks.
5.1 Flat Damage Cost Recovery Fee and Axle Based Damage Cost Recovery Fee
Comparison
South Carolina currently collects a flat fee of $30 for single trip overweight
permits and $100 for annual overweight permits, both of which include a permit
administrative fee. This research showed that trucks with identical loads but different axle
configurations incur different damage costs. A flat fee is an average value and does not
account for truck configurations and axle load distributions. Table 26 provides a
comparison of axle-based damage cost recovery fee (Column 3) and flat damage cost
recovery fee (Column 2). Based on the damage estimation, to recover additional
pavement and bridge damage costs completely due to overweight trucks, a flat damage
cost recovery fee of $55 (about two times of current flat fee in South Carolina) would
need to be collected from each overweight trip. The flat damage cost recovery fee was
calculated as a weighted average of axle based damage cost recovery fees. The relative
weight of each truck type was estimated by dividing the number of trips in each truck
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type with the total number of trips by all truck types. In a flat damage cost recovery fee
type, 2-axle overweight trucks would be paying 129% more compared to an axle based
damage cost recovery fee, while 4-axle combination trucks would pay 40% less with a
flat damage cost recovery fee compared to an axle based damage cost recovery fee. In
effect, ignoring the axle distribution in flat damage cost recovery fee will cause some
truck types to pay more than actual damage they imparted and some truck types will pay
less than the actual damage they imparted.
Table 26 Axle Based Damage Fee and Flat Damage Fee (per Trip)
Truck Type

Additional
Damage up to
Maximum
Overweight
Limit (dcij)

Flat
Additional
Damage for
Overweight
Trucks (dc)

Difference
between Axle
Based Damage
and Flat
Additional
Damage

2-axle, 35-40 kips
3-axle, single unit, 46-50 kips

$24.19

$54.93

$30.74

$14.58

$54.93

$40.34

3-axle, combination, 50-55 kips

$37.53

$54.93

$17.40

4-axle, single unit, 63.5-65 kips

$27.42

$54.93

$27.50

4-axle, combination, 65-70 kips

$90.80
$61.40
$29.16

$54.93
$54.93
$54.93

-$35.88
-$6.47
$25.77

5-axle, 80-90 kips
6-axle, 80-90 kips
6-axle, 90-100 kips

$67.99

$54.93

-$13.06

6-axle, 100-110 kips
7-axle, 80-90 kips

$120.61
$18.05

$54.93
$54.93

-$65.69
$36.88

7-axle, 90-100 kips

$40.45

$54.93

$14.48

7-axle, 100-110 kips

$71.23

$54.93

-$16.30

7-axle, 110-120 kips
7-axle, 120-130 kips

$112.20

$54.93

-$57.27

$164.83
$13.84

$54.93
$54.93

-$109.90
$41.09

8-axle, 80-90 kips
8-axle, 90-100 kips

$30.70

$54.93

$24.22

8-axle, 100-110 kips

$56.46

$54.93

-$1.53

8-axle, 110-120 kips
8-axle, 120-130 kips

$85.72
$126.24

$54.93
$54.93

-$30.79
-$71.31
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5.2 Weight Based Damage Cost Recovery Fee
Based on pavement and bridge damage estimates, to recover additional damage
completely above the legal weight limit by overweight trucks in a weight based damage
cost recovery fee type, a per ton per trip damage cost recovery fee between $2.77 to
$36.57 (Column 4, Table 27) is attributed to different truck types. Truck type specific per
ton per trip damage cost recovery fee (Column 4, Table 27) beyond the legal weight limit
was estimated by dividing axle based damage cost recovery fee (Column 2, Table 26) by
additional weight above the legal weight limit. A comparison between the average per ton
per trip damage cost recovery fee (Column 5, Table 27) and the truck type specific per
ton per trip damage cost recovery fee (Column 4, Table 27) is presented in Column 6 of
Table 27. The average damage cost recovery fee per ton per trip was estimated as
follows:

∑

(
∑

)
(

)

Analysis showed truckers with 3-axle combination, 4, or 5 axles will pay less per
trip under a simple average per ton per trip damage cost recovery fee type (Column 5)
than under a damage cost recovery fee type that account for how axles are distributed in a
specific truck type (Column 4). In essence, ignoring the axle distribution means that
truckers with 3-axle combination, 4, or 5 axles will be subsidized by other truck types
that cause less damage comparatively.
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5.3 Weight and Distance Based Damage Cost Recovery Fee
To recover additional overweight damage costs above legal weight limit with a
damage cost recovery fee type based on weight and distance, per ton-mile damage fee
between $0.0173 and $0.1354 (Column 3, Table 28) would need to be assessed from
different overweight truck types. Truck type specific damage cost recovery fees per tonmile (Column 3, Table 28) were calculated by dividing the axle based damage cost
recovery fee per trip (Column 2, Table 26) by the additional weight above the legal
weight limit and trip length. The average damage cost recovery fee per ton-mile (Column
4, Table 28) was estimated as follows:

∑
∑

(

)

(

)

A comparison between the average per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee and
truck type specific per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee is presented in Column 5 of
Table 28. Table 28 indicates that a truck with 2-axle, 3-axle combination and 4 axles will
benefit from permitting fees that consider average per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee.

74

Table 27 Weight Based Damage Fee for Different Truck Types (per Ton per Trip)
Truck Type

Overweight
Tonnage (wij)

Damage at
the Legal
Weight Limit

Additional Damage
above the Legal Limit
up to the Maximum
Overweight Limit
(wdcij)

Average of Additional
Damage above the Legal
Limit up to the Maximum
Overweight Limit

Difference between
Truck Specific
Damage and Average
Additional Damage

2.5

$1.51

$9.68

$11.95

$2.27

2

$1.08

$7.29

$11.95

$4.65

3-axle, combination, 50-55 kips

2.5

$2.22

$15.01

$11.95

-$3.06

4-axle, single unit, 63.5-65 kips

0.75

$3.05

$36.57

$11.95

-$24.62

4-axle, combination, 65-70 kips

2.5

$4.06

$36.32

$11.95

-$24.38

5-axle, 80-90 kips

5

$1.83

$12.28

$11.95

-$0.33

6-axle, 80-90 kips

5

$1.03

$5.83

$11.95

$6.11

6-axle, 90-100 kips

10

$1.03

$6.80

$11.95

$5.15

6-axle, 100-110 kips

15

$1.03

$8.04

$11.95

$3.90

7-axle, 80-90 kips

5

$0.57

$3.61

$11.95

$8.34

7-axle, 90-100 kips

10

$0.57

$4.04

$11.95

$7.90

7-axle, 100-110 kips

15

$0.57

$4.75

$11.95

$7.20

7-axle, 110-120 kips

20

$0.57

$5.61

$11.95

$6.34

7-axle, 120-130 kips

25

$0.57

$6.59

$11.95

$5.35

8-axle, 80-90 kips

5

$0.46

$2.77

$11.95

$9.18

8-axle, 90-100 kips

10

$0.46

$3.07

$11.95

$8.88

8-axle, 100-110 kips

15

$0.46

$3.76

$11.95

$8.18

8-axle, 110-120 kips

20

$0.46

$4.29

$11.95

$7.66

8-axle, 120-130 kips

25

$0.46

$5.05

$11.95

$6.90

2-axle, 35-40 kips
3-axle, single unit, 46-50 kips
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Table 28 Weight Distance Based Damage Fee for Different Truck Types (per Ton-Mile)
Truck Type

Damage at
the Legal
Weight Limit

Additional Damage above
the Legal Limit up to the
Maximum Overweight
Limit (wddcij)

Average of Additional Damage
above the Legal Limit up to the
Maximum Overweight Limit

Difference between Truck
Specific Damage and
Average Additional
Damage

2-axle, 35-40 kips

$0.0201

$0.1290

$0.0785

-$0.0505

3-axle, single unit, 46-50 kips

$0.0108

$0.0729

$0.0785

$0.0056

3-axle, combination, 50-55 kips

$0.0178

$0.1201

$0.0785

-$0.0416

4-axle, single unit, 63.5-65 kips

$0.0113

$0.1354

$0.0785

-$0.0569

4-axle, combination, 65-70 kips

$0.0150

$0.1345

$0.0785

-$0.0560

5-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.0115

$0.0767

$0.0785

$0.0018

6-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.0065

$0.0365

$0.0785

$0.0421

6-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.0065

$0.0425

$0.0785

$0.0360

6-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.0065

$0.0503

$0.0785

$0.0283

7-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.0036

$0.0226

$0.0785

$0.0560

7-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.0036

$0.0253

$0.0785

$0.0533

7-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.0036

$0.0297

$0.0785

$0.0489

7-axle, 110-120 kips

$0.0036

$0.0351

$0.0785

$0.0435

7-axle, 120-130 kips

$0.0036

$0.0412

$0.0785

$0.0373

8-axle, 80-90 kips

$0.0028

$0.0173

$0.0785

$0.0612

8-axle, 90-100 kips

$0.0028

$0.0192

$0.0785

$0.0593

8-axle, 100-110 kips

$0.0028

$0.0235

$0.0785

$0.0550

8-axle, 110-120 kips

$0.0028

$0.0268

$0.0785

$0.0517

8-axle, 120-130 kips

$0.0028

$0.0316

$0.0785

$0.0470

76

CHAPTER VI: POLICY TRADEOFF AND
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
To develop effective policies, decision makers (DMs) must develop policy
options

considering

multiple

conflicting

objectives

and

associated

tradeoff

simultaneously. At the same time, it is necessary for DMs to explore the anticipated
impacts of candidate policy options to all stakeholders involved in overweight freight
business. This chapter discussed tradeoff analysis of different fee structures and policy
implications for realizing different fee structures.
6.1 Tradeoff of Fee Structures
Multiobjective analysis is useful in solving complex problems with conflicting
objectives encountered in business, engineering, and planning. In a scenario with multiple
conflicting objectives, there are infinitely many solutions which are equally good. The
decision stage naturally involves a DM with subjective preferences, priorities,
expectations and personal aspirations about conflicting objectives. The differences
between different efficient or Pareto optimal solutions or options, generated from solving
optimization problems with multiple objectives, is that each solution is better in one
objective but worse in another objective. The relative improvement of one objective over
another objective is known as tradeoff. In general, a tradeoff between two objective
functions at a Pareto point is the ratio between increase of one function and decrease of
the other assuming that all other objective functions remain constant. Tradeoffs
quantification is useful to DMs in selecting an alternative after reviewing the trade-offs
between alternatives and used in many multiobjective analysis procedures.
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This section demonstrates how fee structures for overweight permitting affect fee
incidence. A multi-objective model was developed (as described in Chapter 3 section
3.5.2) with the following two objective functions to demonstrate the trade-offs between
different fee structures:


minimizing unpaid bridge and pavement damage cost due to overweight truck
trips (primary objective), and



minimizing overweight permit fees to reduce freight transportation cost
(secondary objective).

The estimated model parameters were incorporated into the bi-objective models
developed in Section 4. Bi-objective models were reformulated into the single-objective
ɛ-constraint models (Chowdhury et al., 2000; Chankong and Haimes, 1983). These
reformulated single-objective models were solved with an optimization software to
generate the optimal solutions that were also Pareto-optimal solutions for the original biobjective models. The ɛ-constraint problem was solved for ten values corresponding to
0% to 100% damage recovery which generate Pareto-optimal solutions of the biobjective models based on type of fee considered in the second objective function.
Performances of both objective functions and tradeoffs are presented in Figure 18 to 21
for the flat, axle based, weight-based, and weigh-distance-based damage cost recovery
fee types, respectively. Each model was solved for an elasticity value of -0.5, -1.0 and 1.5 to represent the sensitivity of the overweight freight demand to the damage cost
recovery fee. Each figure shows the unpaid pavement and bridge damage corresponding
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to several fee levels and the associated tradeoffs. Each model was solved through
optimization software and can be found in Appendix E.
The tradeoffs of the Pareto-optimal solutions of the two objective functions were
calculated as the dual variables associated with the ɛ-constraint related to the second
objective of original bi-objective models. These tradeoff values indicate how much
unpaid damage could be recovered by a unit increase in damage cost recovery fee. For
example, when the flat damage cost recovery fee is $43, the unpaid damage is $22.4
million in year 2012 (for elasticity value of 1.5) (Figure 17). The tradeoff corresponding
to a $43 flat damage cost recovery fee is $4.2 million. The tradeoff of $4.2 million
indicates that increasing the flat overweight damage cost recovery fee by $1 to $44 (from
$43) would reduce the unpaid damage of $4.2 million in a year in South Carolina (in
2012 $). Reduction in unpaid damage is achieved by, (1) more revenue collection from
all overweight trips in South Carolina at a higher fee rate, and (2) an overall reduction in
overweight freight demand in South Carolina. Though the permit fee would increase by a
small amount ($43 to $44), significant reduction in unpaid damage would be achieved
due to the fact that, the additional $1 fee will be collected from all overweight trips made
in a year. The tradeoff analysis conducted in this research did not consider percentage of
overweight trucks without permits as no statistics were available on number of illegal
overweight trips in South Carolina. The tradeoff at different damage cost recovery levels
shows how to select overweight permit policies to achieve the preferred performance
tradeoff. Quantitative tradeoff estimate of each Pareto-optimal solutions provide
information to decision makers to make an informed choice among available policy
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options (fee rates) to select either the best alternative or to modify the generated solutions
towards the direction of an expected tradeoff. Selection of an appropriate level of damage
cost recovery fee depends on tradeoff analysis as well as expected positive and negative
impacts on overweight freight businesses. If none of the generated solutions satisfies
decision makers’ expectations, the interactive multiobjective analysis can be used to
compute new solutions with the input from the decision makers concerning their
respective preferences (Chowdhury et al., 2000; Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005).
In the axle based damage cost fee type, the average axle based permit fee of $43
resulted in unpaid damages of $17.2 million in year 2012 in South Carolina (for elasticity
value of 1.5). The corresponding tradeoff value of $3.8 million indicates that increasing
the axle-based overweight permit fee by $1 on averageto $44 would reduce the unpaid
damage of $3.8 million in a year (Figure 18).
In the weight based damage cost recovery fee type, the average damage cost
recovery fees may be varied between $12.37 per ton (100% damage recovery, upper
limit) to no charge (0% damage recovery, lower limit) (Figure 19). The bi-objective
analysis reveals that when a per ton damage cost recovery fee of $6.2 is levied, the
unpaid damage is $42.3 million (for elasticity value of 1.5), with a corresponding tradeoff
of $23.8 million in year 2012. The tradeoff value indicates that an increase in the per ton
damage cost recovery fee by $1 on average from the $6.2 per ton damage fee would
reduce the unpaid damage of $23.8 million in year 2012 in South Carolina.
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In the weight-distance based damage cost recovery fee type, the average per tonmile damage cost recovery fee may be varied between 9 cents per ton-mile (100%
damage recovery) to no charge (0% damage recovery) (Figure 20). The bi-objective
analysis reveals that when per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee is 6.2 cents the unpaid
damage is $9.9 million (for elasticity value of 1.5), with a corresponding tradeoff value of
$4.6 million in year 2012. A tradeoff value of $4.6 million indicates that increasing per
ton-mile fee by 1 cent per ton-mile on average to 5.6 cents per ton-mile, in turn could
reduce the unpaid damage of $4.6 million in year 2012.
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(a) Pareto optimal solutions
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(b)Tradeoffs of Pareto optimal solutions
Figure 17 Unpaid damage and tradeoffs corresponding to flat damage cost recovery
fees ($10 administrative cost included in flat damage fee)
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(b) Tradeoffs of Pareto optimal solutions
Figure 18 Unpaid damage and tradeoffs corresponding to average axle based
damage cost recovery fee ($10 Administrative cost included in axle based
damage fee)
83

350
Elasticity-0.5

Elasticity-1.0

Elasticity-1.5

300

Total Unpaid Damage (in million $)

250

200

150

100

50

0
$0.0

$2.0

$4.0
$6.0
$8.0
Weighted Per Ton Damage Fee

$10.0

$12.0

(a) Pareto optimal solutions
$70
Elasticity-1.5

Elasticity-1.0

Elasticity-0.5

Tradeoff (in Millions$)

$60
$50
$40
$30
$20
$10
$0
$0.0

$1.2

$2.5

$3.7
$4.9
$6.2
$7.4
$8.7
Weighted Per Ton Damage Fee

$9.9

$11.1

$12.4

(b) Tradeoffs of Pareto-optimal solutions
Figure 19 Unpaid damage and tradeoffs corresponding to average per ton damage
cost recovery fee (administrative fee of $10 was not included in damage fee)
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(b) Tradeoffs of Pareto optimal solutions
Figure 20 Unpaid damage and tradeoffs corresponding to per ton-mile damage cost
recovery fee (administrative fee of $10 was not included damage fee)
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This bi-objective model showed the usefulness of a multiobjective approach to the
overweight freight truck operations policy analysis. Revising trucking fee structures takes
place in a public context, which inherently brings a number of stakeholder interests and
considerations. Implementing policies based on tradeoffs would face many challenges as
discussed in the following section.
6.2 Stakeholders Perspective on Different Fee Types
In stakeholders’ interview, participants expressed their views about different type
of permit fee structures and summarized in the following subsections.
6.2.1 Flat Fee
Most participants in stakeholders’ interview stated that flat fee carries little
advantage beyond its simplicity to maintain. One interviewee mentioned that flat fee is
most unfair for state when it sets at too low and most unfair to trucking companies when
it sets at high compared to damage imparted to pavements and bridges.
6.2.2 Weight Based Fee
Most stakeholders strongly agree weight should be a factor in calculating
appropriate permit fee. However, there are several issues in using weight as a factor:


It is always challenging to weight loads accurately for small rural industries

such as small agricultural company cannot afford installation of scale. If new rules
require scale at loading areas, it will advantage bigger industries which can accommodate
installation cost in their balance sheet easily.
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Another issue stated by stakeholders is the exemption of certain industries to

carry loads above legal weight limits without permits. If significant numbers of trips are
allowed to operate without permits it question the validity of whole permit system.
6.2.3 Distance Based Fee
Most stakeholders strongly agree distance/trip length is a fair indicator to be
considered in calculating appropriate permit fee. Most of the trucks are equipped with
GPS units and tracking trip length is not a big concern to trucking companies. However,
it will be challenging to enforce a distance based fee as enforcement officers will have
hard time to verify total distance travelled by each overweight truck.
6.2.4 Axle Based Fee
Based on engineering analysis of this research, it was evident that axle based fee
structure which consider number of axle, axle configuration, axle load and trip length is
most accurate to represent total damage cost. But implementing axle based fee in South
Carolina will be inconsistent with neighboring states and will create problems for
trucking companies. Most stakeholders recommend to work with neighboring states to
develop consist fee structure which will allow companies to standardize their fleet
configuration that can operate in multiple states.
6.2.5 Annual Permit Fee
Most of the stakeholders felt one flat rate for annual permits is not fair and does
not consider total number of trips made by each permit holder in a year. To incorporate
number of trips, one stakeholder recommended eliminating annual permits and issuing
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single trip permits only to ensure each trip paying fair share of the damage cost.
Stakeholders recognized that eliminating annual permits will increase permit
administration significantly for SCDOT and trucking companies. To establish a more
efficient system, SCDOT will require expending current permit program workforce to
process large permit application volume in a timely manner. One stakeholder suggested a
base fee for annual permit holders and add incremental fee for each trip made in a year
similar to a club membership. Another participant mentioned that flat annual fee keeps
South Carolina trucking companies competitive to neighboring states.
6.3 Policy Implementation Challenges
Decision that’s might increase operating cost of overweight freight transportation
business demand a comprehensive analysis of stakeholders perception about any policy
changes. Based on the stakeholders’ interview with public and private trucking
organizations in South Carolina, this section summarizes stakeholders’ perspectives about
overweight trucking business and SCDOT fee polices.
6.3.1 Impacts on Different Types of Business
Revisions to permit fee structure should consider positive and negative impacts on
different business types. In stakeholders’ interview, one participant defined trucking
business as a diverse industry which requires different types of truck configuration to
transport varieties of goods. Increasing permit fee will disproportionately affect different
businesses depending on business structure of each company. Such as higher fees will
have relatively adverse impact on small business while bigger companies can easily
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accommodate the increased fee. To minimize overall negative impact to different types of
business, decision makers must consider how to provide special considerations to small
business.
All stakeholders in SC recognized the need of more revenue to maintain
transportation infrastructure. Several stakeholders mentioned that as demand for
overweight permits increased; SCDOT has restricted more bridges with limited load
carrying capacity. Load restrictions instead of replacing sub-standard bridges force
trucking

companies

to

take

longer

routes.

Especially

rural

agri-businesses

disproportionately affected because of more sub-standard bridges on rural highways.
Stakeholders have diverse opinions about current South Carolina overweight
permit fee structure. While one stakeholder believe current $30 fee for single trip is
fairest among neighboring states, another stakeholder mentioned that current fee is low
and expressed willing to contribute more to SCDOT maintenance program. One
participant stated the importance of considering trip length in determining appropriate
fee. Though there are conflicting opinions on how current fee structure should be revised,
all stakeholders stressed the need of effective enforcement to deter illegal overweight
trucks. In today’s competing business environment, higher fees will encourage more
illegal overweight trips if there is less surveillance. It is necessary to develop an effective
and efficient enforcement program to deter illegal overweight trips which create
additional financial burden to DOT. Adaptation of technology based truck weight
monitoring systems such as Weigh-In-Motion (WIM) provided most effective
enforcement solution to inspect more trucks efficiently (Cambridge Systematics, 2009).
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The survey of state departments of transportation showed that states have been
using combinations of enforcement techniques to achieve specific regional freight
monitoring goals. Mobile enforcement teams or units and weigh-in-motion (WIM) are the
most commonly used techniques (14 states out of 16 respondents). Traditional weigh
stations (random and fixed schedule) with weight scales were also common; nine states
(out of 16) were maintaining weigh stations 24 hours a day. Four states have
implemented pre-pass check points and other strategies to reduce processing and traffic
operations at checkpoints. One Canadian province reported using remote-controlled
weigh stations. All types of monitoring for enforcement can also contribute data for
system monitoring and traffic modeling.
The most challenging task to deter illegal overweigh trucks is to put sufficient
enforcement efforts with limited resources. Without sufficient enforcement officials and
WIM stations, no state can have a good estimate of the extent of overweight trucks
operating with and without a permit. The few caught through enforcement cannot be
extrapolated to indicate the extent of the problem. As illegal overweight trucks follow
WIM operation schedule closely and avoid permanent weigh stations, mobile
enforcement is critical. Moreover, it is also challenging to pick illegal overweight trucks
based on visual observation as there are no distinct clue to suspect overweight trucks.
Besides, on non-interstate highways, enforcement officers often face challenges to find a
roadside space to scale suspected trucks.
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6.3.2 Appropriate Time for Implementation of Higher Fee
Trucking stakeholders in a recent study in Virginia mentioned that “No time is
good time” to business for implementation of higher permit fee (VTRC, 2008). As
economy advances around good and bad periods, there is no appropriate time for
implementation of higher fees considering global competitive market place. Such as
when economy is growing, new fee might slow down the growth due to higher business
operation cost. On the other hand, when economy is slowing down, new fee might extend
the recession and have bitter impact on overall economy. That means, there will be
always a reason to keep the fee at low level.
Despite this dilemma of appropriate time in economic cycles, several stakeholders
expressed their concerns for deteriorating transportation infrastructure and initiatives
must be taken to improve the situation. One stakeholder indicated that without healthy
transportation system, SC business competitiveness will erode above time. At the same
time, few stakeholders stated that pro-business regulation in South Carolina might not
support any new user fee.
6.3.3 Prioritization of Infrastructure Investment
Revenue generated by increasing fees must be utilized to improve the
infrastructure. South Carolina’s trucking stakeholders had stated their preference on how
additional revenue to be utilized if higher fees were collected from overweight trucks.
None of stakeholders believe permit revenue should go to build new infrastructure rather
to maintain existing infrastructure such as resurfacing, repair and so forth. When it was
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asked to identify key highways that should get priority for improve, stakeholders
mentioned the improvement need of all types of highways from interstate to rural
highways. Though there is no high priority, but rural highways was mentioned most
which are lacking maintenance most. Stakeholders believe because of bad condition of
rural pavement and bridges, businesses need to detour frequently.
One stakeholder stated that SCDOT has been constructing highways will less
expensive materials due to funding shortage which will increase overall life-cycle cost for
highways. Same stakeholder wants to see consideration of life-cycle cost in new
infrastructure maintenance activities funded by permit fee revenue.
6.3.4 Revising Fee Structure- Current Practices
Though recommendations based on engineering studies would offer rational basis
for setting a comprehensive overweight user-fee structure, eleven of the sixteen states
responding to the survey of state DOTs reported that legislature and lobbyists were the
main contributors to decisions on adjusting permit fees. In this research, comprehensive
analysis was conducted to estimate tradeoff analysis to assist policy development.
Implementation of any new fee will face opposition from business and effective
implementation strategies need to be developed to build consensus among stakeholders to
ensure effectiveness of new policies. Though South Carolina stakeholders voiced their
general consensus that SCDOT needs more resources to maintain infrastructure at a good
condition, they do not have common view about overweight permit fee program.
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According to the survey of state departments of transportation, the most common
objectives of overweight fees were:


to recover costs for infrastructure damage incurred accurately and



to increase revenue for infrastructure maintenance programs.

Though all states want to generate revenue to compensate additional damage by
overweight trucks, review of existing fee structures revealed wide inconsistencies among
states. In this scenario, building consensus among stakeholders require to involve in an
ongoing discuss to develop and execution of effective fee policies. Having higher permit
fee may affect demand for overweight permits. Some business may decide to avoid states
with higher permit fees (Bowlby et al., 2001) which will have negative impact on state
economy. Early consideration and exploration of negative impacts of higher permit fee
will guide policy makers to revise implementation strategies accordingly.
6.3.5 Regional Competition and Permit Structure Consistency
Regional competition is one of the biggest factor need to be addressed while
formulating new fee policies. As all neighboring state are competing to attract more
manufacturing plants, existing and new businesses might find other states more profitable
if permit fee were increased. Though increasing fee is challenging in competitive regional
business, without strong infrastructure, only low fee will not ensure competitive
advantage of a state.
In most of cases, a single trip requires trucks to travel multiple states with
different permit fee structures. Figure 21 shows the geographic proximities of states with

93

the five types of single trip fee structures. Flat rates have appeared throughout the United
States with particular prevalence in the southwest. Weight-based policies have emerged
in central states.

Data sources: J.J Keller & Associates, Inc, 2011 and state departments of transportation

Figure 21 Single Trip Overweight Fee Structures in the US
Among South Carolina’s neighbors, two other states have charged flat fees for
regular overweight single trips. North Carolina charges $12 for a single overweight trip,
compared to $30 in South Carolina and Georgia. Florida considers trip length and GVW
to determine per trip fee ($0.27-$0.47 per mile). Tennessee also considers both distance
and weight in its calculations. However, all neighboring states offer annual permits for
flat fees ranging from $100 to $1000 (Table 29).
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Table 29 Overweight Permit Fees from South Carolina’s Neighbors
State

Single Permit Fee

Annual Permit Fee

$30

$100

Florida

$3.33 + $0.27-$0.47 per mile

*$240-$500

Georgia

$30

$150

North Carolina

$12

**$100, $200

$15 + $0.05 per ton-mile

***$500, $1000

South Carolina

Tennessee

*$240 for up to 95,000 pounds and $500 for up to 199,000 pounds,
** $100 for general overweight vehicles and $200 for mobile homes,
***$500 for up to 120,000 pounds and $1000 for 120,000 to 150,000lbs

Multiple stakeholders in South Carolina recommended developing collaborative
efforts among neighboring states to harmonize the permit fee structures. As multi-state
operations are very common for trucking companies, single fee structure will promote
overweight business. If multiple states decide to implement more rationale fee structure
with considerations of number of axle, axle configuration and axle load, trucking
companies will have willingness to invest on fleets to comply with new policies. In this
context, one stakeholder mentioned South Carolina should not establish itself as barrier
state without considering consultation with neighboring states.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
To generate revenue to maintain excessive pavement and bridge damage inflicted
by overweight trucks, transportation policy makers need to match permitting structures
and rates to the needs of transportation infrastructure.

Engineering and economic

analyses need to set rates for permit fees and fines to reduce the political influence and
tying rates to infrastructure costs rather than administrative processes that represent a
minor fraction of the total overweight truck damage. In the following sections,
conclusions and recommendations are presented based on engineering and economic
analyses performed in this research.
7.1 Conclusions
The largest loads on public road systems disproportionately inflict the largest
damage on pavements and bridges. Pavement damage models showed overweight trucks
reduce pavement service life exponentially, and current SCDOT pavement design
standards do not include these heavy trucks. Besides charging overweight trucks for
associated damage, it will be economical to include heavy loads in pavement design to
minimize premature pavement maintenance or rehabilitation.
Analysis of bridge damage models indicated that bridge damage increase
exponentially with increase in GVW. Preservation of bridges will require charging
vehicle for associated damage or designing bridges to withstand higher weight trucks.
Even though, SCDOT issues permits for overweight trucks, current fees do not recover
the amount of imparted pavement and bridge damage.
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Permitting rules and fee structures allowing overweight trucks are inconsistent
from state to state. For shippers, this heterogeneous nature can confuse interstate
overweight trucking operations along major corridors crossing several states, which
suggests a need for coordination among neighboring states. Trucking industry
representatives have indicated they would like to see coordination of fee structures
among states in a region.
Five types of overweight permit fee have been implemented by state DOTs to
recover pavement and bridge damage cost: flat, distance-based, weight-based, weightdistance-based and axle-based fee structures. Flat fees, which South Carolina has been
administering, are most common but least fair in terms of collecting revenue.
Comparative analysis of fee structures conducted in this research has shown relative
performance of fee structures. Considering axle load, axle configuration and trip length in
fee structure will be more appropriate to reflect imparted damages.
Selection of appropriate and responsible fee structure require involving diverse
stakeholders related to overweight trucking business. Web survey responses have
indicated that legislators and lobbyists, rather than engineering analysis of infrastructure
damage costs, have played significant roles in setting overweight fees and fines in most
states.
To generate sufficient revenue to recover the damage inflicted by overweight
trucks, the primary challenge lies in selecting an appropriate permit fee that will enhance
the financial viability of DOTs highway maintenance programs without unnecessary
negative impacts on businesses and economy. A multiobjective model that considers both
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the objectives of public transportation agencies and overweight freight trucking
companies is an important step in developing an effective fee policy. Applying the
multiobjective optimization method, tradeoffs with two objective functions (minimize
unpaid damage, and minimize permit fee) were generated for the purpose of aiding DMs
in South Carolina to select a fee alternative based upon expected impacts from these two
objectives. Bi-objective problem was solved for four most frequent fee structures to
compare the relative tradeoffs of each fee structure. Tradeoff analysis of the weight based
damage cost recovery fee showed that increasing the fee by $1 per ton on average for all
overweight truck types from $7.4 per ton damage fee (at a 70% damage recovery
scenario) would reduce unpaid damage cost of $16.9 million annually with a high
elasticity of demand in South Carolina. Reduction in unpaid damage with an increase in
the permit fee is attributed to additional revenue collected from all overweight trips and
an overall reduction in overweight freight demand. Similarly, in the weight-distance
based damage cost recovery fee type when per ton-mile damage cost recovery fee of 5.3
cents on average (at a 70% damage recovery scenario) is charged, the tradeoff value is
$23.8 million. A tradeoff of $23.8 million means that increasing the fee by 1 cent per tonmile on average from 5.3 cents per ton-mile would reduce unpaid damage by $23.8
million annually with a high elasticity of demand. Additional objectives reflecting
interests of stakeholders who may be affected from any changes in the state policies can
be included in the model to develop more comprehensive policy options.
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7.2 Recommendations
This research has conducted comprehensive analysis to estimate pavement and
bridge damage cost due to overweight trucks, and investigated stakeholder perspectives
in South Carolina and current overweight practices among states. Based on the findings
of this research, the following recommendations were made to improve SCDOT
maintained overweight truck permit program:
1) Enforcement of illegal overweight trucks was identified as of the main
concerns to South Carolina stakeholders. As illegal overweight truck operations is likely
to increase if permit fee were increased, to ensure stakeholders’ support for higher fee,
SCDOT must develop accurate estimate of illegal overweight trips to design effective
enforcement plan.
2) This research estimated per trip damage cost for additional load above legal
weight limits by overweight trucks. Before implementation of any new fee structures, it is
critical to determine the economic impacts of new policies to trucking companies that
ship overweight goods. Therefore, an economic study should be conducted to identify
economic vulnerability of different business type before implementation of new policies.
3) As stakeholders want to know how additional revenue from higher permit fees
will be spent to improve transportation infrastructure, before implementation of new fee
policies, it is also important for SCDOT to have a comprehensive financial plan for new
permit program.
4) Few stakeholders expressed their concern about the current pavements and
bridges design and construction standards. As pavement and bridge damage increase
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exponentially with loads, increasing design standards will improve infrastructure service
life as well as overall life cycle cost. SCDOT should review current design practices to
optimize infrastructure life cycle cost.
5) As most accurate permit fee system will consider number of axle, axle
spacing, axle load and trip length in permit fee calculation, it’ll increase the
administrative burden for SCDOT permit program. To ensure effective transition to new
fee system, an audit should be conducted before and after implementation to identify
issues in terms of additional manpower needs, ways to streamline services such as permit
automation.
6) Online survey with DOTs revealed that in most of the states, legislators play
the biggest role in setting permit fee for overweight trucks. As without engineering
analysis, it’s impossible for legislators to determine appropriate fees, SCDOT must
establish a focus group consists for legislators, trucking company representatives and
SCDOT engineers, and should meet periodically to discuss conflicting issues. Through
this process, a consensus will emerge based on mutual understanding, which will serve
well than a new policy through legislative process.

7) Accurate estimation of damage cost by overweight trucks depends on the
accuracy of different overweight truck characteristic in South Carolina. In this research
percentage of overweight trucks on SCDOT maintained highways was estimated based
on one WIM station data. This estimate can be improved by compiling data from more
WIM stations around the state. In addition, currently trucking companies do not report
trip length for overweight trips. In this research, trip length was estimated based on 2004
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SC economic census. As per trip damage cost is directly related to total miles of travel,
SCDOT should keep track of overweight truck trip lengths which can be utilized to revise
per trip permit fee.
8) As concern was voiced by trucking companies, SCDOT should work with
neighboring states before revising current fee system and should consider neighboring
states future plan. This way, SCDOT can ensure that new permit policies will not
establish SC as a barrier state.
9) In the survey of state departments of transportation, 75% of respondents (12
out of 16) reported they have no set schedule for reviewing overweight fee policies. To
ensure the timely revision of permit fees to adjust for inflation and any other policy
issues, a sunset clause should be incorporated in a new policy. This clause will force
policy makers to work at regular interval to adjust policies to adopt permit rules to
evolving businesses scenarios and will gain support from more stakeholders.
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APPENDIX A
Multiobjective analysis methodology
In the context of freight transportation, conflicting objective criteria may include
freight traffic flow, transportation cost, damage of infrastructure (e.g., pavement, bridge),
and freight truck pollution. Multiobjective analysis consists of two paired stages:
mathematics-based optimization stage and decision maker-driven decision stage (Ehrgott,
2005; Miettinen, 1999).
The goal of the optimization stage is to formulate multiobjective optimization
problems (MOPs), i.e., mathematical programs with multiple objective functions, and
find their solution sets (Ehrgott, 2005; Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005). In multiple conflicting
objectives scenario, there are infinitely many solutions which are equally good. While the
solution set in the optimization sense can be clearly defined based on rigorous
mathematical concepts (such as the Pareto optimality), the decision stage naturally
involves a DM with subjective preferences, priorities, expectations and personal
aspirations which are often not easily described. The differences between different
efficient or Pareto optimal solutions or options, generated from solving optimization
problems with multiple objectives, is that each solution is better in one objective but
worse in another objective. The relative improvement of one objective over another
objective is known as tradeoff. In general, a tradeoff between two objective functions at a
Pareto point is the ratio between increase of one function and decrease of the other
assuming that all other objective functions remain constant
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From the perspective of a DM, the optimization stage of multiobjective analysis is
only a preliminary step to select a final preferred decision which then constitutes the
overall solution to the multiobjective model and, after translation into the real-life
problem context, to the original decision-making problem (Miettinen, 1999). While the
solution set in the optimization sense can be clearly defined based on rigorous
mathematical concepts (such as the Pareto optimality), the decision stage naturally
involves a DM with subjective preferences, priorities, expectations and personal
aspirations which are often not easily described or readily articulated in terms of the
chosen mathematical model. Hence, finding a final solution can still be quite difficult if
DM’s preferences are not completely modeled or known and if the numbers of potential
candidates and objectives are too large to make use of existing enumeration or
visualization techniques.
Of special interest to DMs performing the decision stage are tradeoffs associated
with each Pareto-optimal outcome and a corresponding efficient decision. In general, a
tradeoff between two objective functions at a Pareto point is the ratio between increase of
one function and decrease of the other when moving from this Pareto point to a point in a
small neighborhood assuming that all other objective functions remain constant.
Additionally, if the size of the neighborhood approaches zero, the definition of the
tradeoff is supplemented with a limit of the ratio. In any case, tradeoffs quantification is
of great value to DMs and used in many multiobjective analysis procedures supporting
decision making with multiple criteria. The typical steps involved in executing a
multiobjective analysis are presented in Figure A.1 in the context of research problem
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presented in this paper. Illustrations of the steps are in the example below (Chankong and
Haimes, 1983).
1) Define problem:
Improve overweight
freight operation

2) Identify objectives: Minimize unpaid
damage, Minimize overweight damage fee

3) Identify decision variables and parameters:
Number of trips, ESALs etc.; Develop
functional relationship for constraints: payload,
minimum number of trips, and objective
functions: pavement damage, freight trips

4) Generate Pareto-optimal
outcomes and tradeoffs for
decision makers’ consideration

5) Select best alternative
(Decision)

Figure A.1 Typical multiobjective analysis process
In the context of the freight traffic operation, a general MOP can be formulated as:
Minimize f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = [f1(x1, x2, . . . , xn), f2(x1, x2, . . . , xn), . . . ,fp(x1, x2, . . . , xn)]
Subject to

g(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≤ 0
h(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0
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xi ≥ 0, i = 1,2, . . . , n
The problem involves n decision variables, xi , i = 1,2, . . . , n, and p scalar-valued
conflicting objective functions , fi , i = 1,2, . . . , p, that make up the vector-valued
function f. The variables represent unknown quantities such as the number of trips in
each gross vehicle weight category, the unit load transportation cost, and others, while the
functions model the longevity of pavements and bridges, maintenance requirements on
pavements and bridges, freight trips, and transportation cost. The vectors g and h define
the inequality constraints (such as the number of freight truck in each vehicle class) and
equality constraints (such as the total overweight pay load), respectively.
There are two general classes of approaches to generating efficient solutions of
MOPs: (a) scalarization, and (b) nonscalarizing methods (Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005).
Scalarization methods are used to transform the MOP to a single objective optimization
problem (SOP). Among the nonscalarizing methods other optimality concepts than Pareto
are used, a class of set-oriented methods including a variety of metaheuristics, in
particular, genetic algorithms (Deb, 2001).
In this paper, the ɛ-constraint method, one of the most often applied scalarization
techniques, is selected to carry out the optimization stage of the multiobjective analysis,
because of its relative simplicity in controlling the objective functions while converting
the MOP into an SOP. Epsilon (ɛ)-constraint method can be used in both linear and nonlinear multiobjective optimization scenarios.
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The advantage of the ɛ-constraint method is that if the analyst can determine
upper and lower bounds for the objective functions values, then the original MOP can be
converted into an SOP by moving all objective functions but one to the constraints. The
right-hand-side values of these new constraints are given by the parameter ɛ that is
selected by the analyst from the intervals constructed by the upper and lower bounds so
that the resulting SOP is feasible (i.e., the original constraints together with the newly
added constraints yield a nonempty set of feasible solutions). The objective function that
is not moved to the constraints and remains as the objective function of the SOP is
referred to as the primary objective.
In the ɛ-constraint method, the SOP assumes the following form:
Minimize

fl(x1, x2, . . . ,xn)

Subject to

fk(x1, x2,. . . , xn) ≤ ɛk where k= 1, 2,…,l-1, l+1,….,p
g(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ≤ 0
h(x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 0
xi ≥ 0, i = 1,2, . . . , n

Here, the l-th objective function is chosen as the primary objective to be
minimized and the other objective functions generate the ɛ-constraints with predefined
values of the parameter ɛk , k = 1,2, . . ., l-1, l+1, . . . , p, in the right-hand-side. The
selection of ɛk depends on the analyst who may choose any value from the interval within
which this SOP remains feasible. It is a well-known result that a unique optimal solution
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x* to this SOP is an efficient solution for the MOP and the image f(x*) is Pareto-optimal
for the MOP (Ehrgott, 2005; Ehrgott and Wiecek, 2005; Deb, 2001).
Let (fkmin, fkmax), k =1, 2,…,l-1, l+1,….,p, be the interval determined by the
individual minimum and maximum value of the objective function fk subject to the
constraints of the original MOP. One way of choosing the parameter ɛk is as follows:
ɛ kt = fmin + t (fmax -fmin) / (r - 1)
where r is the desired number of different Pareto-optimal outcomes to be found
and t = 1, 2,….., r-1.
As pareto-optimal points along a Pareto-optimal frontier are inexact indicators of
optimal outcomes, tradeoff analysis is then used to yield ordered Pareto-optimal points
based on a tradeoff measure. A tradeoff λlk between two objective functions k and l at an
efficient solution x* can be calculated following the mathematical relationship
(Chankong and Haimes, 1983):
λlk(x*) = ∂fl / ∂fk, k=1, 2,…,l-1, l+1,….,p where λlk represents the amount
of improvement of the primary objective function, ∂fl, due to a unit deterioration in
objective function ∂fk, k≠ l, while all other objective functions remain constant. When the
ɛ-constraint method is applied to MOPs, tradeoffs can be calculated as the dual variables
(prices) associated with the ɛ constraints.
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APPENDIX B
1) What state do you represent? We will use this information to complement your
responses to data we are gathering from state web sites.
_______________________________________________________________________
Freight Monitoring
2) What types of enforcement strategies does your state use to enforce truck weight
limits on the road system?
a. 24-hour weigh stations

□

b. Part-time weigh stations (regular operating schedule)

□

c. Part-time weigh stations (random operating schedule)

□

d. Mobile weigh equipment units or teams

□

e. Weigh-in-motion (WIM)

□

f. Pre-pass checkpoints

□

g. Other: ________________________________________
3) How many teams or stations of the following does your state use to enforce truck
weight limits on the road system? Enter a number for each line.
a. 24-hour weigh stations

_____

b. Part-time weigh stations

_____

c. Mobile weigh equipment units or teams

_____
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d. Weigh-in-motion (WIM)

_____

(Standalone-not located near weigh stations)
e. Pre-pass checkpoints

_____

(Standalone-not located near weigh stations)
f. Other: ________________________

_______________

4) What type of truck information does your state check at weigh stations?
Checked
□

a. Vehicle classification
b. Number of axles

□

c. Axle loads

□

d. Axle spacing

□

e. Gross vehicle weight

□

f. Trip origin

□

g. Trip destination

□

5) Are data on the number of trucks checked for weight categorized by axle limits and
gross vehicle weight limits? (ie. Is the number of trucks whose axle weights were
checked recorded as well as the number of trucks whose gross vehicle weights were
checked recorded?)
□ Yes

□ No
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6) Are data on the number or percentage of trucks exceeding weight limits categorized
by axle limits and gross vehicle weight limits?
□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 5) or 6) is no, skip to question 8).
7) How many trucks in calendar year 2010 fit in the following categories? Please enter
either the absolute number of trucks or the percentage of all trucks. If the data are not
readily available, who may we contact to obtain these data?
Percentage or Number Contact name Contact email or phone
a.

Trucks checked for axle loads

___________ _____________ ____

b.

Trucks at or under legal axle weight

c.

Permitted trucks with axle(s) overweight

______ ______ ________

d.

Trucks with axle(s) overweight (no permit)

______ ______ ________

e.

Gross vehicle weights checked ______ ___________ _____________

f.

Trucks at or under legal gross vehicle weight ______ _____ _____

g.

Permitted trucks over the gross vehicle weight limit

h.

Trucks over gross vehicle weight limit (no permit) ______ ______ _____

______ _____ _____________

______ ______ ________

8) What is the percentage or number of trucks in calendar year 2010 for each of the
following? If the data are not readily available, who may we contact to obtain these data?
Percentage or Number Contact name Contact email or phone
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a.

Trucks checked for gross vehicle or axle weight ___________ ______ ______

b.

Trucks at or under weight limits

c.

Trucks over gross vehicle or axle weight limit (no permit) _____ ______ ______

d.

Permitted trucks over gross vehicle or axle weight limit _____ ______ ______

______ _____ _____

9) What, if any other vehicle information does your state check and/or keep records of at
weigh stations? ______________________________________________________
10) Does your state keep records on fines issued for overweight violations?
□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 10) is no, skip to question 12).
11) Is the severity of the overweight violations included in records on fines issued for
overweight violations?
□ Yes

□ No

□ Do not know

12) Who may we contact about records on fines issued for overweight violations?
a. Name
b. Email or phone
Overweight Vehicles
13) How does your state handle trucks with overweight permits? Check all that apply.
o Checked for declared weight at weigh stations
o Checked for declared weight by weigh-in-motion units

112

o Checked for declared weight by mobile units
o Not checked by enforcement efforts
o Other _______________
14) Does your state keep records on permits issued for overweight vehicles?
□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 14) is no, skip to question 16).
15) How many overweight permits were issued in calendar year 2010?

_____

16) Does your state estimate how many overweight trucks (exceeding axle or gross
vehicle weight) without permits are not caught by enforcement efforts?
□ Yes

□ No □ Do not know

If the answer to question 16) is “do not know,” skip to question 0.
If the answer to question 16) is no, skip to question 20).
17) How many overweight trucks (exceeding axle or gross vehicle weight) without
permits does your state estimate are not caught by enforcement efforts?
_______________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
18) How does your state derive these estimates?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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19) Who can we contact to learn about these estimates of overweight trucks not caught by
enforcement efforts?
a. Name
b. Email or phone
Trucking Fee Structures
20) Who participates in determining the structure for overweight fees?
□ Advisory committee
□ Focus group
□ Legislature and lobbyists
□ Dedicated DOT department
□ Maintenance or engineering department of DOT
□ Business stakeholders
□ Other:_________________________________________________________
21) Have the fee structures been reviewed on a set schedule?
□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 21) is no, skip to question 23).
22) How frequently has the fee structure been reviewed?
□ ≤ 1 year

114

□ 2-3 years
□ 4-5 years
□ 6-7 years
□ 8-9 years
□ ≥ 10 years
23) When was the last revision of overweight fee structures performed?
Year:__________________________
24) Based on the last change in the overweight fee structure, what were the main factors
in the decision? Check all that apply.
□ Reduce freight costs to encourage freight activity
□ Increase freight costs to discourage freight activity
□ Accurately recover costs for infrastructure damage incurred
□ Increase revenue for infrastructure maintenance program
□ Other:_________________________________________________________
□ I do not know.
If the answer to question 24) is “I don’t know,” skip to question 27).
25) Has your state conducted an economic or engineering study for developing or
reviewing the fee structure?
□ Yes

□ No
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If the answer to question 25) is no, skip to question 27).
26) How can we find this study or who can we contact about it?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
27) Who can we contact to inquire about changes in the overweight fee structure?
a. Name

_____________________________

b. Email or phone

_____________________________

Trucking Fine Structures
28) Who participates in determining the structure for illegal and overweight fines?
□ Advisory committee
□ Focus group
□ Legislature and lobbyists
□ Dedicated DOT department
□ Maintenance or engineering department of DOT
□ Business stakeholders
□ Other:_________________________________________________________
29) Have the fine structures been reviewed on a set schedule?
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□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 29) is no, skip to question 31).
30) How frequently has the fine structure been reviewed?
□ ≤ 1 year
□ 2-3 years
□ 4-5 years
□ 6-7 years
□ 8-9 years
□ ≥ 10 years
31) When was the last revision of illegal and overweight fine structures performed?
Year:_____________________________
32) Based on the last change in the illegal and overweight fine structure, what were the
main factors in the decision? Check all that apply.
□ Discourage illegal and overweight freight activity
□ Accurately recover costs for infrastructure damage incurred
□ Increase revenue for infrastructure maintenance program
□ Other:_________________________________________________________
□ I do not know.
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If the answer to question 32) is “I don’t know,” skip to question 35).
33) Has your state conducted an economic or engineering study for developing or
reviewing the fine structure?
□ Yes

□ No

If the answer to question 33) is no, skip to question 35).
34) How can we find this study or who can we contact about it?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
35) Who can we contact to inquire about changes in the illegal and overweight fine
structure?
a. Name

_____________________________

b. Email or phone

_____________________________

Surface freight in the next 10 years
36) How does your state expect its magnitude and distribution of freight volume by mode
to change in the next 10 years?
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
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37) How does your state expect demand for designated trucking routes in your state to
change in the next 10 years? Include changes due to generators such as ports, airports,
distribution centers or specific industries, as well as any other changes your state
foresees.
______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
38) How is changing demand affecting freight and infrastructure planning in your state?
For example, will your state make changes to designated trucking routes, implement
highway

technologies,

facilitate

mode

shift,

or

take

other

measures?

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
39) What is your state doing to increase freight capacity? (check box options will be: not
considered, considered but no implemented, implemented, implemented but since ceased)
a. Creating/extending highway corridors or routes

□

□

□

□

b. Adding capacity to existing highway corridors

□

□

□

□

c. Adding truck-only lanes

□

□

□

□

d. Adding truck-only toll lanes (TOT)

□

□

□

□

e. Improving highway access or capacity to ports

□

□

□

□

f. Improving highway access or capacity to airports

□

□

□

□

g. Improving highway access to rail

□

□

□

□
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h. Improving rail access or capacity to ports

□

□

□

□

i. Improving rail access or capacity to airports

□

□

□

□

j. Upgrading functionally obsolete infrastructure

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

□

(e.g., weight-restricted bridges)
k. Easing freight-related restrictions
(e.g. increasing weight limits)
l. Improving regulation efficiency
(e.g. implementing weigh-in-motion technology)
m. Introducing mandatory freight-traffic bypasses

n. Other: _____________________________________________________________
40) If you have any further comments about freight planning in your state, this survey, or
this study, please include them here.

Thank you for your time completing this survey. If there is anyone else who might
contribute further to this study please forward the survey to them.
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APPENDIX C
Survey Response Summary Tables
Table C.1 Types of Enforcement strategies
Enforcement Strategies

States/Provinces
14
14
11
7
9
4

Mobile weigh equipment units or teams
Weigh-in-motion (WIM)
Part-time weigh stations (random operating schedule)
Part-time weigh stations (regular operating schedule)
24-hour weigh stations
Pre-pass checkpoints
Table C.2 Number of Enforcement stations/ Teams
Number of stations/teams
Enforcement type
24-hour weigh stations
Part-time weigh stations
Mobile weigh equipment units or
teams
Weigh-in-motion
(WIM)
(Standalone-not located near weigh
stations)
Pre-pass checkpoints (Standalonenot located near weigh stations)

0
1

2
16

1
9

8
80

Standard
Deviation
3
19

0

36

27

140

40

0

12

4

100

25

0

1

0

8

2

Minimum Mean Median Maximum

Table C.3 Type of information collected by Enforcement
Type of information collected
States/ Provinces
Axle loads
16
Axle spacing
16
Gross vehicle weight
16
Number of axles
15
Vehicle classification
13
Trip origin
11
Trip destination
11
Other information: Tax, Registration, Safety compliance, Driver hours of service,
dangerous goods, permit conditions, load securement, safety equipment,
mechanical condition, insurance, Equipment, log books, equipment, DOT number
etc.
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Table C.4 Participants involved in determining overweight permit fee and violation
fine
Participants
Legislature and lobbyists
Dedicated DOT department
Maintenance or engineering department of DOT
Business stakeholders
Advisory committee
Focus group
Other
* State Police, Judicial branch, Special Committee

Overweight
fee

Illegal Overweight
fine

11
5
4
4
2
1

12
4
2
1
4
0
*4

Table C.5 Last revision of Overweight Permit fee and Violation fine structure
Last revision

Overweight fee

Last Year
1-5 Years ago
6-10 Years ago
11-15 Years ago
More than 15 Years ago

1
5
3
2
5

Illegal Overweight
fine
0
2
2
2
4

Table C.6 Factors considered in Overweight fee and violation fine setting
Factors
Overweight
Illegal Overweight
fee
fine
Discourage illegal and overweight freight activity
6
Do not know
7
4
Accurately recover costs for infrastructure damage
4
1
incurred
Increase revenue for infrastructure maintenance
2
1
program
Other
*5
**2
*To cover increased administrative costs, Ensure that the overweight permit program is
not subsidized by taxpayers, To bring fees closer to surrounding states ,Deter the operation
of overweight vehicles
** Public safety, Allowing 80,000 lbs on part of other highways

122

Strategies to improve freight capacity:
1
Creating/extending highway corridors or routes
2
Adding capacity to existing highway corridors
3
Adding truck-only lanes
4
Adding truck-only toll lanes (TOT)
5
Improving highway access or capacity to ports
6
Improving highway access or capacity to airports
7
Improving highway access to rail
8
Improving rail access or capacity to ports
9
Improving rail access or capacity to airports
10
Upgrading functionally obsolete infrastructure (e.g., weight-restricted bridges)
11
Easing freight-related restrictions (e.g. increasing weight limits)
12
Improving regulation efficiency (e.g. implementing weigh-in-motion technology)
13
Introducing mandatory freight-traffic bypasses
10

Strategies to improve freight capacity

9

Not
considered

8

Number of States

7
6

Considered
but not
implemented

5

Implemented

4
Implemented
but since
ceased

3
2
1
0
1

2

3

4

5

6

7
8
Strategies

9

10

11

12

Figure C.1 Strategies to improve freight capacity
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APPENDIX D
Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_ Rural (1/2)

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
85%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

19728.9
19336.6
16576
14813.2
13145.5
9464.84
839.508
358.36
84.7363
5.94517
1.73059
1.73059

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

4529.3599
5869.9871
274.28648
5068.379
3990.3407
458

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

13145.5

12154

14054.1
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Actual
Coverage
95.06

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Rural_3Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

2926.26
2926.26
2870.05
1737.37
679.122
276.037
176.386
34.6934
3.42195
2.48619
2.48619

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

574.00089
664.38307
101.31747
778.46781
369.53396
43

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

1210.71

679.122

2926.26

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
1137.03

Lower 95%
672.102

Upper 95%
1970.77
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Actual
Coverage
95.03

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Rural_5_6

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

2150.58
2150.58
1230.41
668.614
371.483
211.167
55.3733
10.2247
1.1453
0.28013
0.28013

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

285.12592
348.95414
14.825641
314.24737
256.00446
554

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

569.293

480.191

607.31

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
568.184

Lower 95%
483.693

Upper 95%
608.228
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Actual
Coverage
95.06

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Rural_7

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

1598.24
1598.24
1598.24
749.709
339.607
154.095
30.3163
4.44003
0.47387
0.47387
0.47387

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

275.88802
373.40144
47.42203
370.71423
181.06181
62

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

641.497

396.194

985.493

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
580.455

Lower 95%
359.876

Upper 95%
806.878
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Actual
Coverage
95.01

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Urban_11

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

17075.2
17075.2
17075.2
15758.8
12032.4
9297.73
646.97
39.3294
27.762
14.9771
14.9771

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

8101.2569
5826.4013
752.18517
9606.3759
6596.1378
60

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

14083.5

12103.6

16839.2

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
14381.9

Lower 95%
13164.9

Upper 95%
15913.5
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Actual
Coverage
95.60

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Urban_12

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

15957.8
15957.8
15957.8
15514.7
1789.12
586.501
483.744
254.649
254.649
254.649
254.649

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

2978.114
5189.352
932.03514
4881.5837
1074.6443
31

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

10869

1654.92

15957.8

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
4474.94

Lower 95%
1491.51

Upper 95%
15861
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Actual
Coverage
95.94

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Urban_14

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

3421.33
3421.33
3117.68
2280.78
1007.34
527.061
191.513
72.9499
1.35991
0.91406
0.91406

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

771.53214
815.39851
63.86694
897.65119
645.41308
163

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

1701.8

1380.43

2290.3

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
1718.92

Lower 95%
1386.38

Upper 95%
2225.16
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Actual
Coverage
95.27

Distributions
AvgDlyTrkLds2011_Urban_16

Quantiles
100.0%
99.5%
97.5%
90.0%
75.0%
50.0%
25.0%
10.0%
2.5%
0.5%
0.0%

maximum

quartile
median
quartile

minimum

3136.28
3136.28
3136.28
2364.09
717.856
291.992
50.1013
7.78063
0.77979
0.77979
0.77979

Summary Statistics
Mean
Std Dev
Std Err Mean
Upper 95% Mean
Lower 95% Mean
N

580.4511
826.73558
132.38364
848.44777
312.45442
39

Custom Quantiles
Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate

Lower 95%

Upper 95%

1942.91

531.755

2364.09

Smoothed Empirical Likelihood Quantiles
Quantile
85%

Estimate
1247.82

Lower 95%
616.892

Upper 95%
2374.61
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Actual
Coverage
96.11

APPENDIX E
AXLE BASED FEE MODELS
Elasticity -1.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f2*0.1712+f3s*0.0167+f3c*0.0529+f4s*0.0003+f4c*0.0245+f5*0.7129
+0.0106*(f61*0.14+f62*0.32+f63*0.54)+0.0107*(f71*0.01+f72*0.03+f7
3*0.07+f74*0.13+f75*0.76)+0.0002*(f81*0.01+f82*0.05+f83*0.03+f84*
0.1+f85*0.81)<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30));
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n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery Upper Limit;
x>=0; !recovery Lower Limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 24.19 *x+10;
f3s= 14.58*x+10;
f3c= 37.53*x+10;
f4s= 27.42*x+10;
f4c= 90.80*x+10;
f5= 61.40*x+10;
f61= 29.16*x+10;
f62= 67.99*x+10;
f63= 120.61*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=

18.05*x+10;
40.45*x+10;
71.23*x+10;
112.20*x+10;
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f75= 164.83*x+10;
f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

13.84*x+10;
30.70*x+10;
56.46*x+10;
85.72*x+10;
126.24*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 24.19 +10;
f13s= 14.58+10;
f13c= 37.53+10;
f14s= 27.42+10;
f14c= 90.80+10;
f15= 61.40+10;
f161= 29.16+10;
f162= 67.99+10;
f163= 120.61+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

18.05+10;
40.45+10;
71.23+10;
112.20+10;
164.83+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

13.84+10;
30.70+10;
56.46+10;
85.72+10;
126.24+10;

END
:
Elasticity -1.0
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f2*0.1712+f3s*0.0167+f3c*0.0529+f4s*0.0003+f4c*0.0245+f5*0.7129
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+0.0106*(f61*0.14+f62*0.32+f63*0.54)+0.0107*(f71*0.01+f72*0.03+f7
3*0.07+f74*0.13+f75*0.76)+0.0002*(f81*0.01+f82*0.05+f83*0.03+f84*
0.1+f85*0.81)<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30));
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n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 24.19 *x+10;
f3s= 14.58*x+10;
f3c= 37.53*x+10;
f4s= 27.42*x+10;
f4c= 90.80*x+10;
f5= 61.40*x+10;
f61= 29.16*x+10;
f62= 67.99*x+10;
f63= 120.61*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

18.05*x+10;
40.45*x+10;
71.23*x+10;
112.20*x+10;
164.83*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

13.84*x+10;
30.70*x+10;
56.46*x+10;
85.72*x+10;
126.24*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 24.19 +10;
f13s= 14.58+10;
f13c= 37.53+10;
f14s= 27.42+10;
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f14c= 90.80+10;
f15= 61.40+10;
f161= 29.16+10;
f162= 67.99+10;
f163= 120.61+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

18.05+10;
40.45+10;
71.23+10;
112.20+10;
164.83+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

13.84+10;
30.70+10;
56.46+10;
85.72+10;
126.24+10;

END
:
Elasticity -0.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
!x<=1;
f2*0.1712+f3s*0.0167+f3c*0.0529+f4s*0.0003+f4c*0.0245+f5*0.7129
+0.0106*(f61*0.14+f62*0.32+f63*0.54)+0.0107*(f71*0.01+f72*0.03+f7
3*0.07+f74*0.13+f75*0.76)+0.0002*(f81*0.01+f82*0.05+f83*0.03+f84*
0.1+f85*0.81)<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30));
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n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
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x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 24.19 *x+10;
f3s= 14.58*x+10;
f3c= 37.53*x+10;
f4s= 27.42*x+10;
f4c= 90.80*x+10;
f5= 61.40*x+10;
f61= 29.16*x+10;
f62= 67.99*x+10;
f63= 120.61*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

18.05*x+10;
40.45*x+10;
71.23*x+10;
112.20*x+10;
164.83*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

13.84*x+10;
30.70*x+10;
56.46*x+10;
85.72*x+10;
126.24*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 24.19 +10;
f13s= 14.58+10;
f13c= 37.53+10;
f14s= 27.42+10;
f14c= 90.80+10;
f15= 61.40+10;
f161= 29.16+10;
f162= 67.99+10;
f163= 120.61+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

18.05+10;
40.45+10;
71.23+10;
112.20+10;
164.83+10;

f181= 13.84+10;
f182= 30.70+10;
f183= 56.46+10;
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f184= 85.72+10;
f185= 126.24+10;
END
:
FLAT FEE BASED MODELS
Elasticity -1.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f2<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30));
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n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 54.93 *x+10;
f3s= 54.93*x+10;
f3c= 54.93*x+10;
f4s= 54.93*x+10;
f4c= 54.93*x+10;
f5= 54.93*x+10;
f61= 54.93*x+10;
f62= 54.93*x+10;
f63= 54.93*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
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f75= 54.93*x+10;
f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 54.93+10;
f13s= 54.93+10;
f13c= 54.93+10;
f14s= 54.93+10;
f14c= 54.93+10;
f15= 54.93+10;
f161= 54.93+10;
f162= 54.93+10;
f163= 54.93+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=
END
:

54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;

Elasticity -1.0
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f2<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
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n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
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n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 54.93 *x+10;
f3s= 54.93*x+10;
f3c= 54.93*x+10;
f4s= 54.93*x+10;
f4c= 54.93*x+10;
f5= 54.93*x+10;
f61= 54.93*x+10;
f62= 54.93*x+10;
f63= 54.93*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 54.93+10;
f13s= 54.93+10;
f13c= 54.93+10;
f14s= 54.93+10;
f14c= 54.93+10;
f15= 54.93+10;
f161= 54.93+10;
f162= 54.93+10;
f163= 54.93+10;
f171= 54.93+10;
f172= 54.93+10;
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f173= 54.93+10;
f174= 54.93+10;
f175= 54.93+10;
f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;

END
:
Elasticity -0.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f2<=f; !f, epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30));
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n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0; n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0;
n751>=0; n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 54.93 *x+10;
f3s= 54.93*x+10;
f3c= 54.93*x+10;
f4s= 54.93*x+10;
f4c= 54.93*x+10;
f5= 54.93*x+10;
f61= 54.93*x+10;
f62= 54.93*x+10;
f63= 54.93*x+10;
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f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;
54.93*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 54.93+10;
f13s= 54.93+10;
f13c= 54.93+10;
f14s= 54.93+10;
f14c= 54.93+10;
f15= 54.93+10;
f161= 54.93+10;
f162= 54.93+10;
f163= 54.93+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=
END
:

54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;
54.93+10;

WEIGHT BASED FEE MODELS
Elasticity -1.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
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!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+f
51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f7
21*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+f
821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30));
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#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),

n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30) #LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),
0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30));
n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0; n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0;
n751>=0; n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*9.68*x+10;
f3s= 2*7.29*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*15.01*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*36.57*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*36.32*x+10;
f5= 5*12.28*x+10;
f61= 5*5.83*x+10;
f62= 10*6.80*x+10;
f63= 15*8.04*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

5*3.61*x+10;
10*4.04*x+10;
15*4.75*x+10;
20*5.61*x+10;
25*6.59*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*2.77*x+10;
10*3.07*x+10;
15*3.76*x+10;
20*4.29*x+10;
25*5.05*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*9.68+10;
f13s= 2*7.29+10;
f13c= 2.5*15.01+10;
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f14s= 0.75*36.57+10;
f14c= 2.5*36.32+10;
f15= 5*12.28+10;
f161= 5*5.83+10;
f162= 10*6.80+10;
f163= 15*8.04+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

5*3.61+10;
10*4.04+10;
15*4.75+10;
20*5.61+10;
25*6.59+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*2.77+10;
10*3.07+10;
15*3.76+10;
20*4.29+10;
25*5.05+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21=9.68*x;
f3s1=7.29*x;
f3c1=15.01*x;
f4s1=36.57*x;
f4c1=36.32*x;
f51=12.28*x;
f611=5.83*x;
f621=6.80*x;
f631=8.04*x;
f711=3.61*x;
f721=4.04*x;
f731=4.75*x;
f741=5.61*x;
f751=6.59*x;
f811=2.77*x;
f821=3.07*x;
f831=3.76*x;
f841=4.29*x;
f851=5.05*x;
END
:
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Elasticity -1.0
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+f
51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f7
21*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+f
821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30) #LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30));
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n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*9.68*x+10;
f3s= 2*7.29*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*15.01*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*36.57*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*36.32*x+10;
f5= 5*12.28*x+10;
f61= 5*5.83*x+10;
f62= 10*6.80*x+10;
f63= 15*8.04*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

5*3.61*x+10;
10*4.04*x+10;
15*4.75*x+10;
20*5.61*x+10;
25*6.59*x+10;
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f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*2.77*x+10;
10*3.07*x+10;
15*3.76*x+10;
20*4.29*x+10;
25*5.05*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*9.68+10;
f13s= 2*7.29+10;
f13c= 2.5*15.01+10;
f14s= 0.75*36.57+10;
f14c= 2.5*36.32+10;
f15= 5*12.28+10;
f161= 5*5.83+10;
f162= 10*6.80+10;
f163= 15*8.04+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

5*3.61+10;
10*4.04+10;
15*4.75+10;
20*5.61+10;
25*6.59+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*2.77+10;
10*3.07+10;
15*3.76+10;
20*4.29+10;
25*5.05+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21=9.68*x;
f3s1=7.29*x;
f3c1=15.01*x;
f4s1=36.57*x;
f4c1=36.32*x;
f51=12.28*x;
f611=5.83*x;
f621=6.80*x;
f631=8.04*x;
f711=3.61*x;
f721=4.04*x;
f731=4.75*x;
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f741=5.61*x;
f751=6.59*x;
f811=2.77*x;
f821=3.07*x;
f831=3.76*x;
f841=4.29*x;
f851=5.05*x;
END
:
Elasticity -0.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+f
51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f7
21*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+f
821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30));
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n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*9.68*x+10;
f3s= 2*7.29*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*15.01*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*36.57*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*36.32*x+10;
f5= 5*12.28*x+10;
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f61= 5*5.83*x+10;
f62= 10*6.80*x+10;
f63= 15*8.04*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

5*3.61*x+10;
10*4.04*x+10;
15*4.75*x+10;
20*5.61*x+10;
25*6.59*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*2.77*x+10;
10*3.07*x+10;
15*3.76*x+10;
20*4.29*x+10;
25*5.05*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*9.68+10;
f13s= 2*7.29+10;
f13c= 2.5*15.01+10;
f14s= 0.75*36.57+10;
f14c= 2.5*36.32+10;
f15= 5*12.28+10;
f161= 5*5.83+10;
f162= 10*6.80+10;
f163= 15*8.04+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

5*3.61+10;
10*4.04+10;
15*4.75+10;
20*5.61+10;
25*6.59+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*2.77+10;
10*3.07+10;
15*3.76+10;
20*4.29+10;
25*5.05+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21=9.68*x;
f3s1=7.29*x;
f3c1=15.01*x;
f4s1=36.57*x;
f4c1=36.32*x;
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f51=12.28*x;
f611=5.83*x;
f621=6.80*x;
f631=8.04*x;
f711=3.61*x;
f721=4.04*x;
f731=4.75*x;
f741=5.61*x;
f751=6.59*x;
f811=2.77*x;
f821=3.07*x;
f831=3.76*x;
f841=4.29*x;
f851=5.05*x;
END
:
WEIGHT DISTANCE BASED FEE MODELS
Elasticity -1.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
(f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+
f51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f
721*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+
f821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019)*100<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Trip length;
t2=75; t3s=100; t3c=125; t4s=270; t4c=270; t5=160; t6=160;
t7=160; t8=160;
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!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
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x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*0.129*t2*x+10;
f3s= 2*0.0729*t3s*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c*x+10;
f5= 5*0.0767*t5*x+10;
f61= 5*0.0365*t6*x+10;
f62= 10*0.0425*t6*x+10;
f63= 15*0.0503*t6*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

5*0.0226*t7*x+10;
10*0.0253*t7*x+10;
15*0.0297*t7*x+10;
20*0.0351*t7*x+10;
25*0.0412*t7*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*0.0173*t8*x+10;
10*0.0192*t8*x+10;
15*0.0235*t8*x+10;
20*0.0268*t8*x+10;
25*0.0316*t8*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*0.129*t2+10;
f13s= 2*0.0729*t3s+10;
f13c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c+10;
f14s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s+10;
f14c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c+10;
f15= 5*0.0767*t5+10;
f161= 5*0.0365*t6+10;
f162= 10*0.0425*t6+10;
f163= 15*0.0503*t6+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=

5*0.0226*t7+10;
10*0.0253*t7+10;
15*0.0297*t7+10;
20*0.0351*t7+10;
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f175= 25*0.0412*t7+10;
f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*0.0173*t8+10;
10*0.0192*t8+10;
15*0.0235*t8+10;
20*0.0268*t8+10;
25*0.0316*t8+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21= 0.129*x;
f3s1= 0.0729*x;
f3c1= 0.1201*x;
f4s1= 0.1354*x;
f4c1= 0.1345*x;
f51= 0.0767*x;
f611= 0.0365*x;
f621= 0.0425*x;
f631= 0.0503*x;
f711=
f721=
f731=
f741=
f751=

0.0226*x;
0.0253*x;
0.0297*x;
0.0351*x;
0.0412*x;

f811=
f821=
f831=
f841=
f851=
END
:

0.0173*x;
0.0192*x;
0.0235*x;
0.0268*x;
0.0316*x;

Elasticity -1.0
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
(f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+
f51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f
721*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+
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f821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019)*100<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Trip length;
t2=75; t3s=100; t3c=125; t4s=270; t4c=270; t5=160; t6=160;
t7=160; t8=160;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+1.0*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+1.0*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+1.0*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+1.0*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+1.0*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+1.0*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f62)/30));
n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+1.0*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+1.0*(30-f75)/30));
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#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+1.0*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*0.129*t2*x+10;
f3s= 2*0.0729*t3s*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c*x+10;
f5= 5*0.0767*t5*x+10;
f61= 5*0.0365*t6*x+10;
f62= 10*0.0425*t6*x+10;
f63= 15*0.0503*t6*x+10;
f71=
f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

5*0.0226*t7*x+10;
10*0.0253*t7*x+10;
15*0.0297*t7*x+10;
20*0.0351*t7*x+10;
25*0.0412*t7*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*0.0173*t8*x+10;
10*0.0192*t8*x+10;
15*0.0235*t8*x+10;
20*0.0268*t8*x+10;
25*0.0316*t8*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*0.129*t2+10;
f13s= 2*0.0729*t3s+10;
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f13c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c+10;
f14s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s+10;
f14c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c+10;
f15= 5*0.0767*t5+10;
f161= 5*0.0365*t6+10;
f162= 10*0.0425*t6+10;
f163= 15*0.0503*t6+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

5*0.0226*t7+10;
10*0.0253*t7+10;
15*0.0297*t7+10;
20*0.0351*t7+10;
25*0.0412*t7+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*0.0173*t8+10;
10*0.0192*t8+10;
15*0.0235*t8+10;
20*0.0268*t8+10;
25*0.0316*t8+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21= 0.129*x;
f3s1= 0.0729*x;
f3c1= 0.1201*x;
f4s1= 0.1354*x;
f4c1= 0.1345*x;
f51= 0.0767*x;
f611= 0.0365*x;
f621= 0.0425*x;
f631= 0.0503*x;
f711=
f721=
f731=
f741=
f751=

0.0226*x;
0.0253*x;
0.0297*x;
0.0351*x;
0.0412*x;

f811=
f821=
f831=
f841=
f851=
END

0.0173*x;
0.0192*x;
0.0235*x;
0.0268*x;
0.0316*x;
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:
Elasticity -0.5
!Minimize Unpaid Damage Cost($);
min= (f12-f2)*n21+(f13s-f3s)*n3s1+(f13c-f3c)*n3c1+(f14sf4s)*n4s1+(f14c-f4c)*n4c1+(f15-f5)*n51+(f161-f61)*n611+(f162f62)*n621+(f163-f63)*n631+(f171-f71)*n711+(f172-f72)*n721+(f173f73)*n731+(f174-f74)*n741+(f175-f75)*n751+(f181-f81)*n811+(f182f82)*n821+(f183-f83)*n831+(f184-f84)*n841+(f185-f85)*n851;
!Fee Constraint (minimize fee, 2nd objective);
(f21*0.17122+f3s1*0.01670+f3c1*0.05291+f4s1*0.00025+f4c1*0.02449+
f51*0.71293+f611*0.00151+f621*0.00335+f631*0.00573+f711*0.00011+f
721*0.00028+f731*0.00072+f741*0.00140+f751*0.00815+f811*0.000003+
f821*0.00001+f831*0.00001+f841*0.00002+f851*0.00019)*100<=f; !f,
epsilon value;
!Current Trip Frequency;
n2=496667; n3s=48448; n3c=153473; n4s=735; n4c=71052; n5=2067989;
n6=30723; n7=30927; n8=681;
n61=0.14*n6; n62=0.32*n6; n63=0.54*n6;
n71=0.01*n7; n72=0.03*n7; n73=0.07*n7; n74=0.13*n7; n75=0.76*n7;
n81=0.01*n8; n82=0.05*n8; n83=0.03*n8; n84=0.1*n8; n85=0.81*n8;
!Trip length;
t2=75; t3s=100; t3c=125; t4s=270; t4c=270; t5=160; t6=160;
t7=160; t8=160;
!Revised Trip Frequency;
n21= @if (n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30) #LT# (0.1*n2),(0.1*n2),
n2*(1+0.5*(30-f2)/30));
n3s1= @if (n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3s),(0.1*n3s),
n3s*(1+0.5*(30-f3s)/30));
n3c1= @if (n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n3c),(0.1*n3c),
n3c*(1+0.5*(30-f3c)/30));
n4s1= @if (n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4s),(0.1*n4s),
n4s*(1+0.5*(30-f4s)/30));
n4c1= @if (n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30) #LT# (0.1*n4c),(0.1*n4c),
n4c*(1+0.5*(30-f4c)/30));
n51= @if (n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30) #LT# (0.1*n5),(0.1*n5),
n5*(1+0.5*(30-f5)/30));
n611= @if (0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30) #LT# (0.1*n61),(0.1*n61),
0.14*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f61)/30));
n621= @if (0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30) #LT# (0.1*n62),(0.1*n62),
0.32*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f62)/30));
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n631= @if (0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30) #LT# (0.1*n63),(0.1*n63),
0.54*n6*(1+0.5*(30-f63)/30));
n711= @if (0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30)
0.01*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f71)/30));
n721= @if (0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30)
0.03*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f72)/30));
n731= @if (0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30)
0.07*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f73)/30));
n741= @if (0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30)
0.13*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f74)/30));
n751= @if (0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30)
0.76*n7*(1+0.5*(30-f75)/30));

#LT# (0.1*n71),(0.1*n71),
#LT# (0.1*n72),(0.1*n72),
#LT# (0.1*n73),(0.1*n73),
#LT# (0.1*n74),(0.1*n74),
#LT# (0.1*n75),(0.1*n75),

n811= @if (0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30) #LT# (0.1*n81),(0.1*n81),
0.01*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f81)/30));
n821= @if (0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30) #LT# (0.1*n82),(0.1*n82),
0.05*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f82)/30));
n831= @if (0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30) #LT# (0.1*n83),(0.1*n83),
0.03*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f83)/30));
n841= @if (0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30) #LT# (0.1*n84),(0.1*n84),
0.1*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f84)/30));
n851= @if (0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30) #LT# (0.1*n85),(0.1*n85),
0.81*n8*(1+0.5*(30-f85)/30));
!Minimum Trip Frequency;
n21>=0; n3s1>=0; n3c1>=0; n4s1>=0; n4c1>=0; n51>=0;
n611>=0; n621>=0; n631>=0;
n711>=0; n721>=0; n731>=0; n741>=0; n751>=0;
n811>=0; n821>=0; n831>=0; n841>=0; n851>=0;
x<=1; !recovery upper limit;
x>=0; !recovery lower limit;
!Permit Fee at x% recovery;
f2= 2.5*0.129*t2*x+10;
f3s= 2*0.0729*t3s*x+10;
f3c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c*x+10;
f4s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s*x+10;
f4c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c*x+10;
f5= 5*0.0767*t5*x+10;
f61= 5*0.0365*t6*x+10;
f62= 10*0.0425*t6*x+10;
f63= 15*0.0503*t6*x+10;
f71= 5*0.0226*t7*x+10;
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f72=
f73=
f74=
f75=

10*0.0253*t7*x+10;
15*0.0297*t7*x+10;
20*0.0351*t7*x+10;
25*0.0412*t7*x+10;

f81=
f82=
f83=
f84=
f85=

5*0.0173*t8*x+10;
10*0.0192*t8*x+10;
15*0.0235*t8*x+10;
20*0.0268*t8*x+10;
25*0.0316*t8*x+10;

!Maximum Permit Fee;
f12= 2.5*0.129*t2+10;
f13s= 2*0.0729*t3s+10;
f13c= 2.5*0.1201*t3c+10;
f14s= 0.75*0.1354*t4s+10;
f14c= 2.5*0.1345*t4c+10;
f15= 5*0.0767*t5+10;
f161= 5*0.0365*t6+10;
f162= 10*0.0425*t6+10;
f163= 15*0.0503*t6+10;
f171=
f172=
f173=
f174=
f175=

5*0.0226*t7+10;
10*0.0253*t7+10;
15*0.0297*t7+10;
20*0.0351*t7+10;
25*0.0412*t7+10;

f181=
f182=
f183=
f184=
f185=

5*0.0173*t8+10;
10*0.0192*t8+10;
15*0.0235*t8+10;
20*0.0268*t8+10;
25*0.0316*t8+10;

!Fee charged without administrative fee;
f21= 0.129*x;
f3s1= 0.0729*x;
f3c1= 0.1201*x;
f4s1= 0.1354*x;
f4c1= 0.1345*x;
f51= 0.0767*x;
f611= 0.0365*x;
f621= 0.0425*x;
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f631= 0.0503*x;
f711=
f721=
f731=
f741=
f751=

0.0226*x;
0.0253*x;
0.0297*x;
0.0351*x;
0.0412*x;

f811=
f821=
f831=
f841=
f851=
END
:

0.0173*x;
0.0192*x;
0.0235*x;
0.0268*x;
0.0316*x;
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